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ABSTRACT
As in most countries over the world, in Venezuela homeownership is considered a social
good, but in spite of the efforts made during the last 50 years to improve the
homeownership affordability, the number of houses produced every year is smaller than
the population's growth and the housing deficit increases every year.
During the last 10 years, the basic economic conditions in Venezuela, have severely
affected housing affordability as inflation rates rose and interest rates became more volatile.
In order to fight the volatility of interest rates and support the housing affordability, the
Venezuelan government have created by law, a pool of resources nurtured by private and
public obligatory contribution, that is used to lend money at subsidized fixed interest rate,
creating in consequence, negative net present values from these operations.
This thesis explores the governmental housing policies implemented in Venezuela during
the last 10 years to raise homeownership rates and improve housing conditions. It also
examines the interest rate as the component that maintains the buying capability of money in
inflationary environment and the different results of the theoretical application of alternative
mortgages designed to reduce the negative effects of inflation on the affordability of
houses.
Results of simulations for the 1976 to 1995 period are presented that demonstrate that there
are at least three different mortgages designs that surpass Venezuelan current housing
financial system. MIT and Mexican Dual Indexed Mortgage proved to be the best
alternatives for protecting in an inflationary environment, both borrowers and lenders'
interest, at the same time.
In the case of MIT this is accomplished by making use of two distinct interest rates -a
floating "effective rate," which controls what the borrower and lender effectively pay and
receive, an a fixed "payment rate," whose only purpose is to ensure a desirable, affordable
path of monthly payments. In the case of Mexican Dual Indexed Mortgage the effects of
inflation upon lenders are addressed through indexation of payments to market rates, while
at the same time, borrowers have their payments linked to a wage index, with any shortfall
in real payments capitalized for later repayment. These two dual indexed systems
safeguards the interest of both groups while it provides for continued lending activities and
a strong construction activity and employment.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Franco Modigliani
Title: Institute Professor, Emeritus
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1. Introduction
Addressing Venezuela's affordable housing demand is an ambitious and complex task for
both the public and private sector. According to the Venezuela's XII national census taking
in 1990, the country had a population of 18 million inhabitants and a housing deficit of
around 880,000 units. This number has been growing during the past five years because the
housing sector built some 240,000 units, while the demand for new residential units grew
during this period to approximately 360,000 units. As a consequence, the housing deficit
today is approximately 1 million units.
According to population growth projections from the Venezuelan Central Office of Statistics
and Information, the growing population over the next decade will demand an average of
100,000 new dwelling units each year. If we add the current deficit of 1 million units to the
projections over the next ten years requiring another 1 million units, we see the necessity to
produce 2 million units in ten years if we want to solve Venezuela's housing problem. Such a
big challenge involves not only the mobilization of financial resources, managerial
capabilities, the labor force, construction materials and available lands, but also the formidable
task of dealing with an adverse economic environment, marked by a serious double digit
inflation.
The world is divided between countries that understand that economic rules must be followed
to avoid inflation and economic failure, and countries that believe that global economic
forces can be manipulated by creating artificial economic paradises which they hope can last
forever.
Venezuela fits into the category of developing countries that have attempted to evade
economic realities by establishing controls and giving away subsidies, resulting in an
extremely unfavorable economic situation characterized by a high deficit and growing
inflation, which is deteriorating the standard of living of Venezuelans.
In spite of the fact that the Venezuelan government has made significant efforts to protect the
housing sector over the years with special subsidies to support developers, financial
institutions and buyers, I am persuaded that this housing sector cannot escape economic
reality and indefinitely sustain its development with the support of subsidies. An effective and
realistic solution to the housing crisis will be found only when Venezuela stops trying to
create an artificial economic environment and begins to use solid economic strategies
designed by Venezuelan economists, or adapted from other countries that have coped
successfully with similar problems, or a combination of both.
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This thesis will try to demonstrate that as a result of Venezuela's high inflation, which has
fluctuated during the last ten years between 30 percent and 81 percent a year, the interest rate
subsidies for constructing or buying affordable houses granted by the housing policy law
with the money stemmed from mandatory savings and obligatory public budget allocations,
creates an artificial environment that denies economic reality and produces random and
regressive subsidies that are counterproductive, inadequate and unfair to the Venezuelan
population. The current financial mechanism for funding new housing should be
transformed into a more equitable financial system which I will present in this thesis. I will
also explore alternative financial mechanisms used in other countries to overcome the
difficulties created by inflation.
The housing finance problem in Venezuela is to some extent one of low and highly skewed
income level. However it is exacerbated by a high inflationary environment. With high
nominal interest rates, the real costs of standard mortgages are shifted toward the early years
of the loan rather than being spread roughly evenly over time following the growing income
of the buyers.
The obvious solution is to devise a mortgage instrument that carries these real costs into later
years. There are various mortgage designs that address this problem in different ways but
they all have a common denominator: indexation. One proposes the adjustment of principal
in line with the price level index , other propose the indexation of the interest rate used to
compute the annual payment to some designated interest rate, another suggests the indexation
of the payments in line with wages or prices or some other indicator. A different one
proposes the use of dual indexation, one index being the market rates and the other the wage
index. One of our task will be to determine if in order for financial transactions to take place
between borrowers and financial intermediaries, indexes of some form are essential in
economies like Venezuela's.
My goal is to find and present to the Venezuelan government, sound evidence that
demonstrates the clear superiority of viable mortgage options that surpass under the current
high inflation in Venezuela our present housing financial system, allowing in consequence
more homeless to afford to buy homes generating at the same time more employment in the
construction industry. I believe this would be a practical contribution to the country's
development process.
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2. Current Situation of Venezuelan Capital Market
2.1 General Background
Venezuela is a democratic republic located in the Northern part of South America. Its
geographical area is approximately 912,050 sq. km and its population was estimated to be
over 18 million inhabitants in 1990. Between 1971 and 1990 the urban population
increased from 72.8 percent to 84.1 percent of the total. Caracas, the capital, is the largest
city and in 1990 concentrated 10.1 percent of the total population. The second largest city is
Maracaibo where most of the oil production takes place.
Exhibit 2.1.2 shows a map of Venezuela and Exhibit 2.1.3 presents a summary of
historical events that have been of central importance in Venezuela's development during
the last two decades. Table 2.1.1. shows some relevant economic indicators .
Exhibit 2.1 1 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
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Exhibit 2.1 3 BRIEF SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL EVENTS SINCE 1974
Year Event
1974 Democratic elections: Carlos Andr6s P6rez elected President.
Current Foreign Debt $ 1.393 billion
1974 Price of crude oil increases from $3,7 1/bbl to $10,53/bbl.
Venezuelan oil's revenues rises from $4,450 millions in 1973 to $10,762
millions in 1974.
1976 Venezuela nationalizes the oil industry
1978 Democratic Elections: Luis Herrera Campins President
Current Foreign Debt $ 23.078 billion
1979 Price of crude oil rises again to $17.69/bbl. Venezuela's price $19.88/bbl
1982 Price of crude oil starts to decline
1983 Democratic elections: Jaime Lusinchi President
Current Foreign Debt: $ 28.718 billion
Current unemployment 10.4 percent
Exchange rate $1= Bs. 6
1986 Price of crud oil falls dramatically to $12.82/bbl. Venezuela's price $15.38/bbl
The government shifts to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies through a
Three Year Infrastructure Investment Program.
1988 Democratic election: Carlos Andres Perez elected President again.
Current Foreign Debt: $ 27.152 billion
Exchange Rate: $1 = Bs. 12.22
Current inflation 30% unknown in Venezuela.
Severe program of economic reforms and modernization
1992 Two military coup d'etat attempts (one in February and one in November)
1993 The President is removed from Office by the Congress accused of misuse of
secret funds.
1993 Ramon J. Velasquez elected interim President
Reforms to Banking Laws
Approval of Tax Laws
1993 Democratic elections: Rafael Caldera elected President again
Current exchange rate: $1 = Bs. 105
1994 40% of commercial banks fail
Economy control program implanted
Devaluation $1 = Bs. 170
Inflation rises to 70%
1995 Inflation = 56%
Foreign currency "black market" develops:
Official rate $1 = Bs. 170 , "Black Market" Rate: $1 = Bs. 460
Unemployment rate rises to 15%.
Market Mortgage Interest Rates = 44% Subsidized Mortgage Interest Rates = 8%
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Table 2.1 1 Economic Indicators
Year Min. Wage
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
450
450
450
900
900
900
900
900
1200
1200
2010
2010
4000
4000
6000
9000
15000
24000
24000
31000
CPI
100.00
107.11
114.45
129.15
158.77
184.12
199.76
211.37
236.97
263.98
294.55
377.25
488.39
900.95
1267.30
1700.71
2235.31
3087.44
4964.93
7939.10
Discount
Rate %
7
7
7.5
11
13
14
13
11
11
8
8
8
8
45
43
40
42
61
55
40
Exchange
Rate
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.78
6.4
7.03
9.16
12.98
12.22
38.74
47.44
56.82
68.38
90.83
148.5
176.6/460*
Exports $ Billions
9342
9661
9174
14360
19275
20181
16516
14759
15878
14283
9122
10437
10082
12915
17278
17623
15161
14200
14783
15897
* During 1995 the official rate was Bs 170/US $ and the market rate was Bs 460/US $ in average
Housing construction in Venezuela has permanently lagged far behind housing needs. For
this reason, the housing deficit has been growing year after year. The growing deficit and
its origin is the central topic of this thesis and will be covered extensively. I believe that this
situation has a multifactor origin, but I am persuaded that lately, the most important factors
have been the growing inflation and an inadequate residential mortgage finance system.
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2.2. Evolution of Long Term Capital Markets
2.2.1 Background
The affordability of housing as a state mandate for Venezuela dates back to 1928 when the
a public institution called the Worker's Bank was created by the government. From that
date on, an administrative mandate for housing the country's people evolved. At the time,
the Worker's Bank was the only public organization with mandate to help Venezuelan
families through public financing.
Until the early 1960s, there was no specialized real estate banking policy in Venezuela. In
1961, the government authorized, promoted and supported with public funds the creation
of mortgage banks. Also in 1961, the government ordered the Worker Bank to establish the
standards for saving and loans institutions whose goal was to provide financing for home
buyers in Venezuela.
Mortgage banks attracted private investors and depositors by offering higher interest rates
than commercial banks' and tax free returns from the savings invested in mortgage-backed
securities. The saving and loan organizations also offered higher tax-free returns on the
interest from the money saved in these institutions. Many people withdrew their money
from their savings accounts in commercial banks and bought mortgage-backed securities
because they offered a higher tax-free return than the commercial banks. The only apparent
source of concern seemed to be the long duration of the investment. Established in the
mortgage's bank contract was the clause that investments could only be redeemed from the
mortgage banks after eight years. The financial authorities, in order to gain the public's
confidence, authorized mortgage banks to repurchase at face value these securities at any
time before the conclusion of the contract as a signal of trust in this fresh financial product.
Everything went fine during the 1960s until the commercial banks in the late 1960s, and
early 1970s started to compete with the mortgage banks, and savings and loan institutions
by offering higher interest rates than mortgage banks and shorter maturity terms. During
the first half of the 1970s, almost all investors who had bought mortgage-backed securities
went to the mortgage banks and sold their securities before the agreed expiration date.
/Z
e In 1960 the commercial bank offered 3% annual interest rate and the mortgage backed securities
offered 7.5% a year.
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By the mid 1970s, interest rates were regulated by the government, and mortgage banks
and savings and loan institutions asked permission from financial authorities to increase the
interest rates they paid to their clients in order to compete with the commercial banks. They
also requested authorization to raise the interest rates charged to borrowers. The
government did not approve these requests and instead decided that in order to maintain
low mortgage interest rates, it would subsidize the interest by giving money to specialized
public institutions to buy mortgage-backed securities that few people desired because of
their low return. By 1980, the government was the only buyer of securities sold by
mortgage banks and the savings and loan institutions. As an example of how far this policy
went, in 1982, the Venezuelan government, through two of its housing institutions,
FONDUR and BANAP2 borrowed from North American commercial banks $2.53 billion at
an annual 18% interest rate (variable rate). The government used these funds to buy
mortgage backed securities yielding a 7% a year from Venezuelan mortgage banks and
saving and loan institutions,. In addition to the difference in interest rate, this variable rate
created a huge maturity mismatch for public housing institutions such as FONDUR and
BANAP much worse. These were the years of the oil boom.
2.2.2. Rise and Fall of the Oil Boom
Between 1974 to 1983 Venezuela changed drastically. After the 1974 oil shock4 , the
Venezuelan economy benefited not only from the enormous profits from its oil sales, but
also from the flow of financial resources that industrialized countries offered at that time at
very low interest rates. The price of crude oil increased from $3.71/bbl in 1973, to
$10.531bbl in 1974 and Venezuelan oil revenues rose from $4,450 million in 1973 to
$10,762 million in 1974.
Between 1974 and 1983, Venezuela suffered from the so called "Dutch Disease", a peculiar
combination of an economic boom and exaggerated political pressures in demand for
distribution of newly received income. Under these circumstances, stable economic growth
is unsustainable. International experience in similar circumstances has demonstrated that
almost every government that experiences an enormous rise in unexpected income cannot
resist the temptation of populism, notably increased the public's expense. Governments
2 FONDUR: Urban Development National Fund created by law in 1974. It had two main purposes: buy
mortgage-backed securities and buy and develop urban land. BANAP: Savings and Loan National Bank:
created by law in 1966, its purpose was to regulate and support the performance of savings and loan
institutions.
1 US dollars
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that experience economic booms often fall into a downward spiral that often ruin their
economies.
Dutch Disease
Increase in external income
(from oil, or other natural resource.)
Increase in public expenses
(construction, employment, etc.)
Expansion of consumption
Inflation of good and services due to high demand
Higher dependence on imported goods
Overpricing of local currency
Reduction of exports
Decline of private investment and employment
Expansion of public spending, employment and public investment
Growing deficit
Inflation
In contrast to the 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s have been very different in Venezuela. After
the second oil shock of 1979, everything changed. Industrial countries went into recession,
and the world economy entered a period of stagnation accompanied by very high real
interest rates. The demand for oil collapsed and debt interest payments on variable-rate loan
shot up. A depression swept over Latin America caused by external factors and intemal
policies. Its impact was felt mostly after 1982 when the price of crude oil started to fall. By
1983, Venezuela had joined the descent of countries whose economic depression had
catastrophic effects on all forms of public and private investment. The unemployment rate
rose from 7.1% in 1982 to 10.30% in 1983.
0 15
* Due to the Arab oil embargo, the prices of crude oil grew from $3.71/bbl in 1973 to $10.53/bbl in
1974.
By 1983, Venezuela's economic situation was very poor and the government had no choice
but to devalue the exchange rate'. Consequently, the only two public institutions that
borrowed US dollars at 18% from North American banks (FONDUR and BANAP), and
bought mortgage-backed securities in bolivares yielding 7% annual interest rates, found
themselves in a very difficult financial situation. With a foreign debt that first increased by
50% and kept increasing, the debt side of their balance sheet was growing faster than their
assets. The devaluation that followed was so large that the government took over the
foreign debt of these institutions in order to prevent bankruptcy.
2.2.3. 1983-1988 The Economic Revival
From 1983 to 1988, Venezuela tried to solve two main economic problems: recession and
disequilibrium. In 1984, the bolivar was devalued once more, this time, from 6.0 Bs/$ to
7.50 Bs/$ and the government severely reduced public expenditure. These measures helped
to improve the economy, and by 1986, the government decided to reinvigorate it by
expanding public investment in a Three Year Investment and Infrastructure Construction
Program whose aim was to reduce the high unemployment rate that by 1984 rose to
13.40%. This was the government's third attempt at stimulating economic growth through
public investment in Venezuela since 1974. GDP growth from 1986 to 1988 was small but
sustained. It grew from Bs. 448,285,000 in 1986 to Bs. 491,372,000. The unemployment
rate dropped from 13.4% in 1984 to 6.9% in 1988.
An important component of the Three Year Investment and Infrastructure Construction
Program was an affordable housing program for middle income families. This housing
program offered long-term fixed-interest rates for house buyers with income up to 6
minimum wages a month6. Nevertheless, due to the fall of international oil prices from
$32.36/bbl in 1985 to $15.38 in 1986, the government did not have enough money for this
housing construction program and it decided to "borrow" large sums of money from the
Public Servants' pension fund to buy mortgage backed securities so that the mortgage
banks and savings and loan institutions could lend money to private developers and house
buyers at fixed low interest rates. The program was very successful and met the goal of
producing more than 40,000 affordable homes in 3 years. The shortcoming was that the
money borrowed from the Public Servant's pension fund was used to buy securities
yielding a fixed interest rate of 7% for 20 years. As a consequence, the buying capacity of
I This was the first devaluation since 1958. The exchange currency rose from 4.30 Bs/$ to 6.0 Bs/$
6 In 1986 a family with up to 6 minimum wages monthly income was considered to be middle income
family.
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the payments did not keep up with the huge double digit inflation that developed during the
following years. The returns from these investments will be of little use to the pensioner.
This was the last attempt to support mortgaged-backed securities in Venezuela. Figure
2.2.1 shows the evolution of the long term deposits in Venezuela for the last 20 years.
Only the Central Bank still holds some MBS that have not expired yet. As indicated before
this is due to the decision of government that did not allow the MBS or the interest rates to
be indexed to inflation and in consequence no private investor is willing to buy these papers
that offer a below market negative return
Figure 2.2 1 Long Term vs. Short Term Assets
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
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0.4
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0.1
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Source: Banco Central de Venezuela
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3. Recent Evolution of the Housing Public Policy
3.1. Economic Reforms
While these strategies helped the economy, the price paid for this economic growth was
very high. The first sign of trouble from this rapid economic growth fueled by public
expenditures was inflation. In 1986, the CPI increased by 11.6% over the previous year.
During 1988, the inflation reached 29.5%, a figure unknown until then in Venezuela.
When a country sinks into a serious upward inflationary spiral, the actions that must be
taken to stop this process and balance the economy are often severe and unpopular. This is
what occurred in 1989, a year of profound changes in Venezuela. A new government,
headed by Carlos Andres Pirez, was elected in December of 1988 and decided to pursue a
program of economic reforms and modernization based on pro-market macroeconomics
policies.
Choosing between a gradual or immediate application of the economic reforms, the
government chose the latter course because, from an economic point of view, it offered
greater coherence and hence more economic viability.
The magnitude of these changes affected the organized sectors who had benefited for many
years from governmental subsidies and the reactions were sharp.
When mortgage interest rates were liberated to market forces and mortgage banks increased
interest rates from 12% in February, 1989, to 40% in July, 1989, most borrowers were
unable to make payments. This stop being a financial problem and became a political
problem, particularly because some 185,000 debtors were middle-income wage earners
whose incomes lagged far behind the interest rates and inflation. The social tensions that
arose at this time and the political protests that met the government's attempts to increase
mortgage payments through indexation, ended with the Venezuelan Congress' approval in
September of 1989 of two housing related laws: the Mortgage Debtor Protection Law and
the Housing Policy Law.
3.2. The Mortgage Debtor Protection Law
This law had two main purposes, the first was to establish a limit or "cap" on interest rate
increases that current and future house buyers would pay to Venezuelan financial
institutions. The price limit of the houses protected by this law was equivalent to 800
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monthly minimum wages7. The second purpose of the new law was to establish a
governmental housing subsidy . The subsidy consisted of an amount equivalent to the
difference between the monthly payments calculated at the "capped" interest rate and the
monthly payment calculated at the market interest rate. The maximum interest rate that the
mortgage debtor should pay was fixed by the law in 19.5% a year while the market rates
have varied over the last 6 years from 28% to as high as 72% a year. The recurrent fiscal
crisis stopped the government from paying subsidies to the financial institutions, which in
turn stopped lending money to middle income families for the past six years.
3.3 The Housing Policy Law (HPL)
For low income families, Venezuela's Congress sanctioned the Housing Policy Law in
1989, the main goals of which were to create : a) a secure growing flow of funds for
building and buying affordable houses through the enforcement of employees savings b) a
mandatory public budget for housing equivalent to 5% of government's ordinary income;
b) an interest rate subsidy and c) an impartial buyer selection procedure
3.3.1. The Obligatory Contribution
Under to the HPL, the public and private sector would contribute in different ways to
increase the flow of funds to the housing market, on a basis affordable to the general
population.
By mandate of the HPL, the different contributors would allocate the following quotas:
1) All workers (public and private) would have the obligation to contribute to the building
and purchasing of affordable houses by allocating 1% of their salaries to earmarked savings
accounts that, by mandate of this law, do not offer any return and whose cumulative
balance cannot be redeemed for at least 20 years or until the worker retires.
2) All employers (public and private) are obliged to contribute to affordable housing by
allocating 2% of their employees' salaries in the earmarked savings accounts of their
employees.
The result is an obligatory saving equivalent to 3% of employees' salaries, 2% allocated by
employers and 1% contributed by the worker.
3) The government (national, regional and local), has the obligation to contribute to
affordable housing by earmarking 5% of their ordinary income for financing the
construction or acquisition of low-income houses.
This price limit of the mortgages protected by the law was established by Congress because it
considered that this price was the maximum that a middle income family could afford. This price limit
was criticized by many private organization that considered it to be very high.
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4) The creation of a National Housing Council to establish rules for the use of money
generated by the mechanism established in the previous points.
5) Access to the funds generated by this law is made through a lottery. The participants
must meet the following requirements a) they must be Venezuelan or a legal resident for at
least five uninterrupted years, b) be a contributor to the obligatory saving accounts.
3.3.2. The Mortgage Interest Rate Subsidy
The funds generated from 1990 to 1995 by the Housing Policy Law, contributed to the
construction and acquisition of 240,000 affordable houses. But due to the fact that it also
created an artificial economic environment by establishing a preferential financing system
that benefited the lottery winners, it also generated large economic distortions that will be
detailed later.
Under the HPL, the National Council of Housing (CONAVI), has the right to establish
interest rates for the funds contributed by the private and public sectors through the
enforced savings detailed earlier and the 5% public budget earmarked for housing. This
right has been used by (CONAVI) to create an artificial economic environment for building
contractors and buyers of affordable housing. While, in the real economy, the price of
borrowing money during the past five years has varied between 40% and 70% of annual
interest rate, the "preferential" interest rates fixed by the CONAVI, have varied between 3%
and 10% of annual interest rates depending on the price of the house, for both short and
long term credits granted by public housing organizations, and the mortgage banks and
savings and loan entities affiliated to the housing policy law.
This situation with interest rates has created a problem that must be addressed because it
has produced what the experts call "regressive subsidies" which give greater subsidies to
higher income families. For example, I will estimate the approximate amount of aid that
beneficiaries receive from loans obtained at the preferential interest rate established by the
National Council of the Housing. Suppose that two families need a mortgage to buy a
house and that both can afford the same monthly mortgage payment equivalent to 25% of
family income. Only one of two families had the luck of winning the lottery established by
the housing policy law and thus received a 20-year loan at a fixed preferential annual
interest rate of 10%. To better understand this situation, let us suppose that the beneficiary
of the drawing is able to pay Bs. 9659 each month and consequently this family can request
8 Source: Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda
* Bs.965 = 25% of family income dedicated to housing expenditure.
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Bs. 100,000 mortgage at the preferential fixed annual interest rate of 10% over 20 year
term as is shown in Table 3.3.1
Table 3.3 1 Subsidized Monthly Payments
Loan (Bs.) Interest Rate Term (years) Monthly Payment (Bs)
100,000 10% 20 965
As we indicated previously, the other family was not lucky enough to win the lottery and
must apply for a credit at variable market rate from a mortgage bank or saving and loan
entity'0 . For our example we will use 46% (see table 3.3.2)
Table 3.3 2 Market Monthly Payments
Loan (Bs.) Interest Rate Term (years) Monthly Payment (Bs)
25,000 46% 20 965
Let us assume that the family's payment capacity at present time is similar to that of the
family that won the lottery, that is to say, approximately Bs. 965 each month. The response
of the financial institution is that with this payment capacity, this family can only receive a
mortgage of Bs. 25,000 because the market interest rate is 46% per year. In other words,
the subsidy is Bs. 75,000 or 75% of the credit amount as is illustrated in Table 3.3.3.
Table 3.3 3 Comparison of Market and Subsidized Payments
Loan (Bs) Interest Rate Term (years) Monthly Payment (Bs)
100,000 10% 20 965
25,000 46% 20 965
Since the amount of the loan is related to the family's income and the interest rate for home
mortgages is similar for all credit applicants of different types of houses protected by this
law , all the winners of the lottery receive the same 75 percent implied subsidy of the
amount of the loan obtained independently of their income being on the higher or lower end
of the income range benefited by the law.
Once the percentage of the credit amount that is subsidized by way of a preferential interest
rate has been determined, we can now go on to illustrate what is meant by the regressive
subsidy.
10 10 (in the past 6 years the mortgage interest rates have varied from 28% in march, 1989 to 70% in
may, 1996 (see figure # xx interest rates)
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Based on the financing conditions instituted by the housing policy law, when a mortgage
applicant of an acquisition credit has an income of only one monthly minimal salary" (Bs.
15,000/ month) he will only be able to access a Bs. 400,000 credit. This potential loan will
enable the applicant to a lot with basic services, and as we have already demonstrated, if the
difference between the real interest rates (46%) and the artificial subsidized interest rates
(7% to 12%) are maintained, the subsidy granted to this home buyer will be equivalent to
75% of the amount of the credit needed to acquire the lot with minimal services such as
electricity, clean water and sewerage system. In other words the mortgage applicant will
receive Bs. 300,000 as is illustrated in Table 3.3.4
Table 3.3 4 Computation of Implicit Subsidy for a family with 1 minimum
wage
Monthly Income Loan (Bs.) Interest rate Subsidy
I Minimum wage 400,000 10% 75% x 400,000 = Bs. 300,000
Now if the mortgage applicant earns up to three minimal wages (Bs. 45,000/ month) he can
be approved a Bs. 900,000 loan and because in this case the subsidy derived from the
preferential interest rate is 75% too of the necessary credit amount to acquire the residence
solution, then the amount that is being subsidized is 75% of Bs. 900,000, that is to say,
Bs. 675,000.
Table 3.3 5 Computation of Implicit Subsidy for a family with 3 minimum
wages
Monthly Income Loan (Bs.) Interest rate Subsidy
3 Minimum Wages 900,000 10% 75% x 900,000 = Bs. 675,000
As is shown in Tables 3.3.4 and 3.3.5, the family with one minimal salary of income, is
granted a mortgage subsidy of Bs. 300,000 while to the other family with three times more
income is granted a mortgage subsidy of Bs. 675,000; known as regressive subsidy. This
means that by virtue of this housing law, a greater subsidy is granted to families with
greater incomes. This situation is equally valid for houses with prices up to Bs. 2,400,000.
People who buy these homes have an income of 6 minimum wages and receive a subsidy
of Bs. 1,800,000.
0 " Since 1974 the government instituted a monthly minimum salary and a monthly minimum wage.
These minimum income are different in the urban and rural areas.
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This situation is very unfair and should be changed. Not only because it is regressive, but
because inflation is constantly eroding the buying capacity of the returned payment which is
unfair to new buyers that contribute to these housing programs with their enforced savings.
If the government thinks it must grant subsidies to help low-and middle income families to
obtain decent housing, these subsidies should have different standards than the current
system.
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4. Financing Residential Properties
4.1 Introduction
Homeownership is a basic goal in Venezuela, and the encouragement of this objective has
been supported for many years by subsidizing directly and indirectly the low and middle
income families and by granting mortgage banks, and saving and lending institutions,
certain operating advantages within the economic system. Mortgage banks and saving
institutions are specialized financial intermediaries fostering personal savings and
homeownership through the concept of thrift, which is basic to our economic system.
Intermediaries serve as a link between individuals and others (savers and investors) with
surplus funds and other individuals and credit markets (mortgages and other loans) with
lack of funds. The institution, acting as intermediary, makes these funds available for home
financing. Healthy growth in lending operations occurs as long as deposit funds continue
to increase and loans continue to be made and repaid.
However, serious imbalances occur when deposits stop increasing. Deposits diminish
when people do not have surplus funds to save or when the interest rates on other types of
investments rise to level that offer attractive alternative to deposit accounts. Then, instead
of placing funds in deposits accounts or purchasing mortgage backed securities, the public
buys market instruments, such as government bonds and corporate stocks.
4.2. The Housing Market
The real estate finance industry has gone in Venezuela through an important evolution
brought about by changing economic conditions. These changing conditions require
lenders and borrowers to have a better understanding of the sources of funds used for
lending and the nature of how risk, economic growth, and inflation affect the availability
and cost of mortgage funds. But before we continue examining the process by which
savings institutions and mortgage banks help millions of families buy their own home, let
us first review the concepts of residential mortgage and inflation.
4.2.1. Definition of Mortgage
A mortgage is a secured loan in which the borrower pledges the home being financed as
security for payment of the loan. A mortgage has three important features: the interest rate,
payment schedule, and amortization period (the term of the loan). These three features
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determine how much the borrower must pay each period and how quickly the home buyer
builds equity through repayment of principal.
There is a wide variety of feasible mortgage designs, some of which we shall evaluate in
this paper, employing the standard mortgage as a basis for comparison.
4.2.2. Defining and Measuring Inflation
Since the main objective of this thesis is the evaluation of alternative mortgages designed to
reduce the negative effects of inflation on the affordability of houses, it is essential to
define inflation and how to measure it. Then we will explain how inflation makes housing
unaffordable and the different approaches utilized to address the repayment -tilt- problem
generated by inflation over the standard or traditional mortgage.
4.2.2.1. Inflation
According to the Oxford dictionary, inflation is a general increase of prices and fall in
purchasing value of money. Other authors simply define it as an increase in the overall
price level. Clearly, not all price increases constitute an inflation. Prices of individual goods
and services are determined in a number of ways. In competitive markets, the interaction of
many buyers and many sellers, the operation of supply and demand, determines prices. In
an administered economy like the Venezuelan economy, the government tries to regulate
and subsidize the price of many products and services
But no matter if the government tries or not to regulate or subsidize the prices, in any
economy, prices are continuously changing as markets adjust to changing conditions. Lack
of rain may dry up corn fields, thus reducing supply and pushing up the price of
agricultural products. At the same time, high levels of production by oil producers may be
driving down the price of oil and petroleum products. Simultaneously, the construction
sector may be negotiating a contract with the govemment that rises (or lowers) wage rates.
When the price of one good rises, that price increase may or may not be part of a larger
inflation. As indicated earlier, an inflation is an increase in the overall price level. It
happens when many prices increase simultaneously.
. 25
4.2.2.2. Price indexes
One way to measure changes in the overall price level is to calculate a price index, which
shows how the average price of a bundle of goods changes over time. Government
agencies compute a number of different prices indexes each month.
In describing how price indexes are constructed, we will use a simple example utilized by
Case and Fair in their textbook Principles of Economics . To construct a price index, we
must first identify the specific set of prices that we are concerned with. Suppose that only
three goods, X, Y, and Z, are produced in an economy Figure 4.2.2 constructs and index
based on changes in the prices of these goods. Between period 1 and period 2, the price of
X went up 50%, the price of Y went up 33.3%, and the price of Z went up 100 percent.
The question is: How much did the general level of prices increase?
Figure 2.2 2 Index Calculation
Units Consumed Price Period I Price Period 2 Percentage change
Good X 2 $1.00 $1.50 50
Good Y 1 $3.00 $4.00 33
Good Z 3 $2.00 $4.00 100
Bundle = 2 units of X + I unit of Y + 3 units of Z
Bundle price, period 1 = (2x$I) + (1x$3) + (3x$2) = $11
Bundle price, period 2 = (2x$1.50) + (Ix$4) + (3x$4) = $19
Price index (period I = base period)
Period I index = bundle price 1 x 100 = $11 x 100 = 100
bundle price 1 $11
Period 2 index = bundle price 2 x 100=j12 x 100 = 172.7
bundle price 1 $11
Inflation = percent change in price index from period I to period 2:
Percent change = period 2 index - period I index x 100 = 172.7 - 100 x 100 = 72.7%
period I index 100
The price level has risen 72.7 percent
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To take into account the relative importance of various items in the construction of a price
index, we need to look at the quantity of each item consumed or produced. Let us assume
that we are interested in the cost of living in an economy where the average household
consumes two units of X, one unit of Y, three units of Z, and nothing else. In figure 4.2.2,
we calculate the price of that "bundle" of goods cost $11. In period 2, the same bundle cost
$19.
To construct a price index using the bundle approach, we must first choose a base year.
Once a base year is chosen and an index is constructed, the index can be used to compare
any given year with any other year. The index for each period is defined as the bundle price
in that year divided by the bundle price in the base year multiplied by 100. Thus, the index
for the base year is always equal to 100 -the bundle price (base year) divided by the bundle
price (base year) equals one, and one times 100 equals 100. To determine the index for
period 2, we use the same formula: (bundle price/base year bundle price)x100 = 19/11 x100
=172.7. . A quick glance at figure 4.2.2 shows us that the price level has increased by
[(172.7 - 100)/100] x 100, or 72.7 percent. The index most often used to measure inflation
is the Consumer Price Index, commonly referred to in the press as the CPI. Currently the
CPI is computed in Venezuela by the Central Bank.
Table 4.2.2 shows values of the CPI since 1976 . The percentage changes in the table on
the left are calculated from the index on the right. For example, from 1970 to 1971, the CPI
increased from 12.31 to 21.56. To calculate the percentage change we simply take [(21.56
- 12.31)/12.31] x 100, which is 75%.
Table 4.2 1 Inflation 1976-1995
Year Inflation Year Inflation
1976 7.58 1986 11.58
1977 7.78 1987 28.08
1978 7.16 1988 29.48
1979 12.31 1989 81.00
1980 21.56 1990 36.40
1981 16.16 1991 31.02
1982 9.56 1992 31.86
1983 6.32 1993 45.92
1984 12.17 1994 70.81
1985 11.4 1995 56.6
Until 1988, Venezuelans were unaware of what life was like under very high inflation. Its
reduction has been from that date a goal of all Venezuelan governments, but their policies
have only made the problem worse.
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4.3. Mechanics of Mortgage Operations
The conditions of the mortgage decide the affordability of purchasing a home. The size of
the downpayment, the interest rate, the term and the periodic payments split the population
between potential buyers and others. With the persistent affordability problem, mortgage
banks and saving and loan institutions as well public housing agencies are increasingly
pressured to offer higher LTV loans. While mortgages requiring only 10% or 5%
downpayment significantly reduce the upfront cash required, they also raise the size of the
loan and therefore the annual housing expenses, increasing the minimum income required
to qualify for the loan. In this section, we will explain the mechanics of different mortgage
designs as well as their advantages and limitations in coping with. the high inflation
environment and real wage uncertainty that characterizes Venezuela's economy.
4.3.1 Operation of the Standard Mortgage Loan
The standard mortgage instrument applicable to affordable houses in Venezuela is a 20-
year, fixed-payment mortgage (FPM), which has a fixed interest rate, a fixed payment, and
is self-amortizing.1 2
With a FPM, the borrower pays the lender the same amount each month and at the end of
the term the loan is paid off. Let's consider the mechanics of an FPM. How much would a
mortgage lender loan today in return for payments of Bs. 1,000 per month for 20 years?
Since a Bs.1 payment in year 20 is worth less than a Bs.1 payment today , the lender
would calculate the present discounted value of the payment stream. The constant payment
per period is an annuity. The present discounted value of an annuity (PDV) is:
PDV = R * _-Jfl/1i)"1 (4.11
where R is the payment, i is the interest rate, and n is the term. For a 20-year FPM with
monthly payments, n = 240 (in months). Assuming an annual interest rate of 10%, i would
be equal to 0.1/12, or 0.0083. Using equation (4.1), payments of Bs.1,000 per month for
20 years would yield a present discounted value of Bs. 103,624. Hence, a lender would
loan Bs.103,624 today in return for Bs.1,000 per month for 20 years. If a homebuyer
purchased a Bs. 125,000 home, and made a down payment of Bs.25,000 (20 percent of the
purchase price), she would need a Bs. 100,000 mortgage. Assuming a 20-year FPM with a
12 A self-amortizing mortgage is one in which, by making all scheduled periodic payments, the amount
borrowed is fully repaid at the end of the term.
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10 percent mortgage rate, what monthly payment would be required? Rearranging equation
(4.1) yields:
R = PDV i (4.2)
where the PDV is now the mortgage amount, Bs. 100,000. The monthly payment would
be Bs. 965. The monthly payments cover interest due and part of the principal. Early in the
mortgage, the majority of each payment goes to interest. As the principal is paid off, the
interest due declines and more of the payment goes to paying off principal. At the end of
the term, both interest due and the total principal are fully paid.
It is important to point out that the FPM has fixed payments over the term of the loan.
However, if there is inflation in the economy over the term of the loan, these payments will
decrease in real (CPI-adjusted) terms. This decrease in real payments is often referred to as
the mortgage tilt real payments are higher in the initial period and decrease over time.
Within limits, this tilt in payments may be viewed as a benefit. The lender as well as some
borrowers may prefer a mortgage with declining real payments. For example, assuming
that incomes keep pace with inflation, the mortgage payments become less of a burden over
time, decreasing the risk of mortgage default".
On the other hand, The "Tilt"' effect has a negative impact on the demand for mortgage
credit. The rise in initial periodic payments, R, in relation to the amount of credit required
in order to acquire housing, PDV, result in numerous households finding themselves
unable to "afford" housing that they would be willing and able to acquire in the absence of
inflationary expectations.
The impact of the tilt effect on the potential borrower can perhaps best be thought of in
terms of the ratio of the initial periodic payment to the household's periodic income. The
effect of an increase in nominal interest rates is to increase this ratio. Not only is the
household unwilling to expend more than a particular portion of its income on mortgage
payments at the time of contract negotiation, but institutional lenders also tend to set limits
on this ratio. These limits can easily become binding constraints in a period of rising long-
term nominal interest rates resulting from increasing inflationary anticipation.
3 DiPasquale-Wheaton Urban Economics and Real Estate Markets pp194-196
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4.3.2. Mortgage Interest Rate
When considering the determinants of interest rates on mortgage loans used to finance
single family residences, we must also consider the demand and supply of mortgage funds,
Most mortgage lenders are intermediaries or institutions that serve as conduits linking flows
of savings from savers to borrowers of those savings in the form of mortgage credit. The
market rate of interest on mortgage loans is established by what borrowers are willing to
pay for the use of funds over a specified period of time and what lenders are willing to
accept in the way of compensation for the use of such funds. On the demand side of the
market, it can be safely said that the demand for mortgage loans is a derived demand, or
determined by the demand for housing.
The demand for housing is generally determined by the number of households desiring
housing, their income, size, age, tastes, preferences for other goods and the interest rate
that must be paid to acquire mortgage credit. Hence the demand for housing establishes, in
large part, the demand for mortgage credit at various rates of interest.
The supply side of the mortgage market is established by what interest rates lenders are
willing to accept when providing funds to borrowers. The amount of credit that they are
willing to supply is a function of their cost of attracting funds from savers, the cost of
managing and originating loans, losses from loan defaults and foreclosures, and, in the
case of fixed interest rate loans, potential losses due to unexpected changes in interest rates
after a loan is made.
When supplying funds to the mortgage market, lenders also consider returns and the
associated risk of loss on alternative investments in relation to returns available on
mortgages. Hence, the mortgage market should also be thought of as part of a larger capital
market, where lenders and investors evaluate returns available on mortgages and on all
competing forms of investment and the relative risks associated with each. Should lenders
believe that a greater return can be earned by making more mortgage loans (after taking
account of costs and the risk of loss), than would be the case if they invested in other
developments such as corporate bonds or business loans, mote funds will be allocated to
mortgage loans, and vice versa. Hence, lender decisions to allocate funds to mortgages are
also made relative to returns and risk on alternative loans and investment opportunities.
4.3.3. The Real Rate of Interest-Underlying Considerations
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When discussing market interest rates on mortgages, we should keep in mind that these
interest rates are based on a number of considerations. In the above discussion, we have
pointed out that the supply of funds allocated to mortgage lending in the economy is, in
part, determined by the returns and risks on all possible forms of debt and investment
opportunities.
The production of investment income interest, rents, and profits occurs through a process
by which individuals, business, and government, or users of savings, compete for those
savings based on returns that they expect to earn on various investments and other uses.
4.3.4. Interest Rates and Inflation Expectations
A justifiable concern that all investors have when making their decisions is how inflation
will affect investment returns. The rate of inflation is of particular importance to investors
and lenders making or purchasing loans made at fixed rates of interest over long periods of
time because it determines the "real" outcome of the loan made at a given (nominal) interest
rate. When deciding whether to make such commitments, lenders and investors must be
convinced that interest rate commitments are sufficiently high to compensate for any
expected loss in purchasing power during the period that the investment or loan is
outstanding, otherwise an inadequate real return will be earned. Therefore, a consensus of
what lenders and investors expect inflation to be during the time that loans and investments
are expected to be outstanding is also incorporated into interest rates at the time such
investments and loans are made.
To illustrate the relationship between the nominal interest rate, or the contract interest rate
agreed on by borrowers and lenders, and real rates of interest, suppose a Bs. 10,000 loan
is made at a nominal or contract rate of 10 percent with all principal and interest due at the
end of one year. At the end of the year, the lender would receive Bs. 11,000, or B s.
10,000 plus Bs. 10,000 times (.10). If the rate of inflation during that year was 6 percent,
then the Bs. 11,000 received at the end of the year would be worth about Bs. 10,377 (Bs.
11,000/1.06). Thus, although the nominal rate of interest is 10 percent, the real rate on the
mortgage is just under 4 percent (Bs. 377 / Bs. 10,000 = 3.77%). We would therefore
conclude that if the lender wanted a 4 percent real rate of interest, the lender would have to
charge a nominal rate of approximately 10 percent to compensate for the expected change in
price levels due to inflation.
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The relation between the "nominal" interest rate usually called the interest rate r on Bs. and
the real outcome can be formalized as follows
Recall that 1+r measure the amount of Bs. at time 1 or Bs(1) that exchange for one Bs.
now, or
Bs(0): 1+r = Bs(1) or r = Bs(l) -1
Bs(O) Bs(0)
Thus if r is 6%, you get (or pay) 1.06 Bs(l) per Bs(O).
But rationale investors should not care about how much money he gets per Bs(0), but how
much purchasing power (or commodity baskets) he gets (or pay) next period. Say x(1) per
basket now, x(0). The real rate, r,. can than be defined as
1+ ra = x(lI or real= x(U)-1
x(0) x(0)
Now x(1)/x(O) can be expressed in terms of r and the change in price level
P() = Bs(I)/X(1) = 1+ i where i is the rate of inflation.
P(O) Bs(O)/X(0)
WehaveX(l) = Bs(0)Bs(1)=_X0) = l+r and P(1)/P()= +i . Thus
X(0) X(O) Bs(0) Bs(1) P(1)/P(O)
1 + r., 1 = Ir
1+i
r-i
(1) Where rreal - ~ r -i and
(2) r=_ (1I + rrej)(1I+i)-1I = r,, + i+ i (r,a) = (approx) rreO +i
(1) give the real rate a person earns (or pays) if he contracted at r and inflation turns out to
be i.
But traditionally there are no markets for r,, (or X(1)/X(O) but only for r, and i is not
known. Then r is determined by the r, the parties can agree on, together with the
expectation of inflation.
Thus
r= rw+i'
where ieis the expected inflation and rw is the intended real rate -not necessarily equal to
rre~
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re =-r-i = rs* i* -i1= re -(i- i*)
and i- i* is unexpected inflation.
Note that since i* is not known in general it is also impossible to measure re.
We can summarize by saying that, the nominal interest rate on any investment is partially
determined by the real interest rate plus a premium for the expected rate of inflation. In our
loan example, the real rate of 4 percent plus and inflation premium of 6 percent equals 10
percent. Note that this premium is based on the rate of inflation expected at the time that the
loan is made. The possibility of inflation being more or less than expected is one of many
risks that must also be considered by lenders and investors.
In general one may expect re, to be stable over time as it is a "real variable" reflecting the
productivity of capital, time preferences the growth rate of population and productivity. If
so the movement of r over time will depend mostly on i*
Hence as Professor Franco Modigliani explains in his proposition of an Inflation Proof
Mortgage (IPM), "the long-term rate is highly responsive to inflation; to a good
approximation an increase in inflation by one percentage point tends to be accompanied by
a one-percentage-point rise in market interest rates. At first glance one might think that this
adjustment of interest rate to inflation would ensure that the monthly payments required to
finance a house with a conventional mortgage would rise in line with inflation-for example,
an increase of inflation from 0 to 5 percent would increase payment by 5 percent. But in
fact this inference is totally wrong-the change in payments required is far greater than that.
To illustrate, suppose we take as a base the interest rate that used to prevail in the pre-
inflationary decades of the 1950s and 1960s, around 5 percent; it then turns out that for
every 1-percent increase in the interest rate above this base the monthly payment on a long-
term mortgage (25 years or longer) rises by some 10 percent and more"
It follows that inflation, even of moderate size, has a dramatic effect in increasing the initial
share of income that a family must earmark to meet its monthly payments. To illustrate,
suppose that a family bought a house worth the traditional 2 1/2- times income. With zero
inflation and a 5-percent interest rate, it would take 20 percent of the family income to
" This can be explained in the following way: the larger the inflation, the larger the nominal rate and
in consequence the term (1 +r)A4) in the FPM equation approximates to zero and the mortgage
payment approximates to the value of a perpetuity. Hence a small variation in the inflation rate,
becomes a large difference in the annual payment.
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finance the house on a 20-year mortgage. if instead inflation were to rise to 5 percent, and
hence the mortgage rate to 10 percent, the monthly mortgage payment would become 50
percent large (10 times the rise in interest rate of 5 percentage points); the share of initial
income needed to meet the monthly payment would thus rise from 20 to 30 percent.
Similarly with a 10-percent inflation the initial share could be expected to rise further to 40
percent, or twice the zero-inflation figure, and so on. It is no surprise then that with
widespread double-digit inflation, so many young people can no longer afford the house
they could aspire to only a few years back."
It should be pointed out that for some time financial instruments have been developed
which enables the parties to negotiate a sure real rate. These instruments are usually
referred to as indexed instruments. They contractually establish a nominal return which is
given by
(1+ rindex) = (1+ r,..)*(1+ ie) = (1 + rs) * P(l)/P(0)
Here the rw is the contractually fixed real rate and the payment the next period is 1+ r..w
multiplied by the price index in period 1 (relative to) which is uncertain, but that uncertainty
offsets that of inflation so that the real return is
1+ re = 1+r = i + re
l+i
The basic feature that ensures this result is that the repayment is made in money of constant
purchasing power.
4.4. Addressing The Repayment Tilt Problem: subsidy or indexation ?
The mortgage repayment tilt problem has been questioned in different countries in one of
two ways: (i) as an affordability problem that required subsidies; or (ii) as a contracting
problem that could be solved by redesigning the mortgage instrument. In principle, this
second approach attempts to deal with the concern of lenders by ensuring that the real value
of repayments is not affected by inflation. It is discussed more fully later. But, let us first
consider the first approach--credit subsidies--as a means to address the inflation-caused
affordability problem.
4.4.1. Credit Subsidies as a Response to High Interest Rates
0 34
Most countries in the world have at one time or another used interest rate subsidies to
reduce mortgage borrowing costs. Venezuela in particular, has solely used this approach to
solve the cash-flow problems of households generated by "re-tilting" the early payments
back to what they would have been without inflation. Credit subsidies are being broadly
used to "buy down" the cost of housing finance with below-market interest rates. While
this practice is widespread, a paper authored by Robert Buckley et al and published in 1989
by the World Bank point out at least three problems with this approach.
First, if the objective of the subsidy is to increase housing consumption, then, because
credit is at least partially fungible, subsidizing credit is less efficient than is subsidizing the
housing expenditure itself. It is inefficient because, as Meltzer (1974) shows, over the
long-term such a subsidy permits households to substitute subsidized credit for their own
savings, and thereby frees their savings to be used for other purchases. Hence, it allows
the subsidies to be spent on activities other than those it was intended to encourage.
Consequently, the efficiency of the subsidy in inducing the intended behavior is
diminished.
Second, below-market credit provides a subsidy to solve what in most cases is a
contracting problem. At rates of inflation lower than 25 percent a year, carefully designed
mortgage indexation schemes can eliminate the cash-flow costs imposed by high nominal
payments, and can do so without subsidy. While it is difficult to measure precisely how
much a credit subsidy really amounts to because of the difficulties in projecting inflation
and the appropriate real interest rate, the per unit subsidy level necessary to eliminate the
inflation-related tilting of repayment is certainly very large. For instance, we have already
showed in section 3.3.2 that with a market rate of 46 percent and a subsidized interest rate
of 10 percent, the subsidy necessary to eliminate the tilt problem is in the order of 80
percent of the value of the house.
Let us define the subsidy as the difference between the present value of the monthly
payments discounted at subsidized rates and the present value of the same stream of
payments discounted at a nominal rate calculated according to Fisher's theory (Nominal
Rate = Real Rate + Inflation + Inflation x Real Rate).
Table 4.4.1 presents the various subsidies percentage that result from different expected
inflation rates. This calculations assume that the lenders require a 5 percent real rate and that
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the nominal rate or rate charged to no-subsidized buyers is calculated according to Fisher's
theory.
The last column shows the subsidy rate required to get mortgage payments back to the
same proportion of family income put towards payments when there is no inflation.
Figure 5.1. 1 Credit Subsidies Implied by Different Interest Rates
Price of House 125000
Loan Amount 100000
Real Rate Expected Nominal Rate = Subsidized Present Value Present Value Subsidy = PV at
Inflation r(real) + Rate of cash flows of cash flows nominal rate - PV
Rate inflation + discounted at discounted at at nominal rate
inflation*r(real) subsidized nominal rate
(Fisher equation) rate
5% 5% 10% 8% 100 87 13
5% 10% 16% J 8% 100 ] 60 40
5% 15% 21% 8% 100 1_ 47 53
5% 20% T 26% 8% 100 39 61
5% 30% 37% 8% 100 27 73
5% 40% 47% 8% 100 22 78
5% 50% 58% 8% 100 18 82
5% 60% 68% 8% 100 15 85
5% 70% 79% 8% 100 13 87
Third, interest rate subsidies do not really solve the repayment tilt problem by reducing the
higher costs in the early years of a loan. Rather, they reduce real repayments throughout the
loan's life. As a result, with a subsidy, interest payments in the later years of the loan can
become trivial rather than just small. For example, instead of being required to allocate as
much as 60 percent of income to repayments as could be the case with a fixed rate loan, a
subsidy sufficient to reduce early payments to affordable levels would call for repayments
in later years that account for 1 or 2 percent of income. Clearly this kind of subsidy
mechanism gives beneficiaries larger than necessary subsidies and usually as it has been
shown in section 3.3.2 it becomes a regressive subsidy.
The final problem with credit subsidies is that the aggregate level of subsidy needed to
eliminate the effects of inflation on housing affordability is simply too large. For example,
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Figure 4.4.1 shows the income group for which fixed nominal payment mortgage
instruments become unaffordable due to an increase in the rate of inflation.
Figure 5.1. 2 Share of Venezuelan Households
repayments with different rates of inflation
able to afford mortgages
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The income distribution figures are for urban family income in Venezuela for 1992. Point A
represents the income level needed for buying a house that costs 2.5 times the median
urban family income, if the household was able to make a 20 percent downpayment and
could finance a 20 year fixed-interest rate loan with 25 percent of their income. Interest on
the loan at 12 percent, reflects a 6 percent real interest rate, and the slightly less than 6
percent inflation rate that characterized the 1950-80 period in Venezuela. The income
needed to qualify is slightly more than the median income level, the 76th percentile.
Point B, the 97th percentile, reflects the income level needed to finance a fixed interest rate
loan that incorporates the higher inflation rates of more recent years. Instead of a 12 percent
nominal interest rate, the appropriate nominal interest rate is 36 percent. The increase in
inflation from 6 to approximately 30 percent has, in the absence of contracts that adjust for
the change in the distribution of real repayments, priced homeownership beyond the ability
to pay for most families. Hence, the absence of indexed mortgage contracts had priced all
those between the 70th and 90th percentiles out of the housing market. If these households
require the level of subsidy for a 30 percent rate of inflation described in Table 4.4.1, on
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the order of 73 percent, it is clear that the government expenditures needed to eliminate the
tilt problem for all the families affected are enormous and not sustainable.
Current subsidies schemes granted by the National Housing Institute in Venezuela are in
excess of 80 per cent per unit. Meanwhile, the annual level of housing production is below
demand and in consequence the housing deficit is continuously growing. If we could find a
mortgage design that can resolve the affordability problem of housing finance under
inflationary environments, subsidies per unit could be reduced and the number of new
housing units produced could be expected to increase significantly. The increase in
production associated with a lower subsidy per unit could in turn be expected to lower the
rents for all those not directly served by the subsidy program. As a result more poor
households would benefit indirectly through the same overall public expenditures.
In the next section we will discuss alternative mortgages designs that have been used
instead of subsidies in different countries for solving the affordability problem, originated
by redistribution of real payments toward the early years of the loan when we use a
standard FRM. We will show that it is possible to improve the affordability of housing
without necessarily using large interest subsidies. Nevertheless, before we move on, it is
helpful to distinguish between two kinds of affordability problems. The first one is faced
by those whose resources are so low that they cannot even afford the minimum standard of
shelter that is available. Some World Bank experts consider that their problems are most
effectively addressed by improvements in the functioning of basic infrastructure supply
and/or providing tenure security, and that encouragement of homeownership through a
more efficient housing finance system is not the most practical direct method of providing
shelter for the very poor"
However we will attempt through simulations, to determine the possibility that a very poor
family supported by way of a direct subsidy (not through interest rate subsidy) and an
indexed payment schedule, equivalent to 10% of their income (instead of 25% used for
middle income household) can also afford to pay market rates.
The second type of affordability problem arises because, when FRM contracts are written
in nominal terms, inflation makes housing unaffordable to most families at market rates of
interest. The focus here is on mortgage contracting procedures that can address this latter
11 Buckley Robert. Mortgage Design Under Inflation and Real Wage Uncertainty: the use of a dual
indexed instrument, The World Bank, 1989.
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housing affordability problem. From this perspective, the objective for redesigning
mortgage contracts is to eliminate financial constraints that impede the affordability of
housing for greater numbers of lower and moderate income households. The primary
objectives are not to produce more housing, although that outcome will often result.
Rather, it is to provide a financing vehicle so that those who could afford a house without
inflation could continue to afford it despite inflation.
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4.5. Operation of Indexed Mortgage Loans
4.5.1. The effects of indexation on inflation
An increasing number of economists, among them as prominent members of the profession
as M. Freedman (1974) and J. Tobin (1972), see in indexation of monetary assets a way of
both attenuating the distributive injustice of inflation and even of reducing the rate of
inflation.
Nevertheless, it is sometimes thought that indexation would worsen the inflation problem.
On a very general level, it is often believed that the very existence of indexation maintains
distrust in the value of money. Indexation is also supposed to create price rigidities in the
economy, any relative price increase being automatically transmitted to all sectors of the
economy with or without indexation.
Indexes are designed to measure fluctuations in certain factors of economic activity. An
index serves as an indicator of past and current financial market conditions. If an index
moves up, the mortgage rate on an adjustable rate mortgage associated with that particular
index would increase and the borrower would be required to make higher monthly
payments. Conversely, if an index rate goes down, monthly payments would be reduced
accordingly. In Venezuela, since 1980, all private mortgage loans use variable rates that
adjust using the CPI variation to determine the debiting and payment rate. In the United
States, mortgage banks use indexes that track interest rate changes on US Treasury
securities or the national Average Mortgage contract rates, for example. In Israel for many
years the outstanding principal and interest payment of the mortgage loans were linked to
the dollar, the CPI, or some combination of the two.
A certain amount of unpredictability in the movement of any index does exist. Some
indexes tend to be more volatile than others, which means their interest rates may vary
more widely and more often than other indexes. An index would tend to be less volatile,
however, if each adjustment were based on the average value of the index over time. The
interest rates on each index typically follow cycles of upward and downward movements.
A new rate on a loan that results from index fluctuations is equivalent to the original
program interest rate, plus or minus the change in the index value as measured by the
difference between the initial and current index rates.
4.5.2 Alternative Mortgage Designs
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The prolonged inflationary period that many countries have suffered when, for very
different reasons, rising interest rates and high home prices pushed affordable loans
beyond the grasp of many prospective owners, nurtured the innovation of new mortgage
designs that attempted to cope with the negative effects of inflation on the affordability of
homes.
As a potential solution to the central problem facing housing finance institutions in an
inflationary environment--i.e., sustaining the flow of funds, indexed mortgage contract
seem promising. For lenders it is a way to preserve the real value of the repayments over
the maturity of the loan. For borrowers, if indexation reduces the large payment burden in
the early years of repayment, it may help prevent them from being locked out of the
housing market by a cash flow constraint
Given the particularly unstable characteristics of current Venezuela's economy, in order to
select an appropriate mortgage design to be applied there, we will compare different
mortgages alternatives, and check how do they manage under uncertain economic
conditions. Different mortgage instruments, for instance, contrast on types of principal,
interest rate, maturity, and on methods of financing and of repayment, and consequently
offer different risks and opportunities that depend on the stability of inflation and interest
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rates. For this purpose, we will heavily rely throughout this section on work done on
alternative mortgage instruments by Prof. Franco Modigliani and Prof. Donald Lessard'6 .
4.5.3. The Variable Rate Mortgage (VRM):
The VRM charges debtor floating rate based on periodically-revised short run nominal rate.
Payments are determined by rescheduling a level payment for the remaining life whenever
the rate changes. Its maturity is fixed. This instrument gained popularity because it
eliminated the risks associated with mismatched of maturities, as it can be safely financed
by short term securities. The concept of adjustable or variable rate financing calls for the
borrower to accept part of the market interest rate uncertainty that lenders had traditionally
shouldered with fixed rate loans. In exchange for assuming some of the risk, or financial
uncertainty, the borrower is "rewarded" with initial interest rates lower than those on
standard fixed rate loans.
One common criticism of the VRM -or of any instrument whose payments vary through
time- is that they increase borrowers risks. This point is arguable because it does not take
into account changes in the borrowers income or patrimony due to variations in inflation
that presumably cause changes in interest rates. On the other hand, the association between
inflation, income, and payments is not very close, because of the tilting effect of the real
repayment schedule. For instance, "if the rate of inflation rises from 3 to 5 percent, the
scheduled payment under VRM rises by 24 percent, whereas the effect on homeowner's
nominal income would be more like.." 7 three percent. The reason for this phenomenon is
that the nominal rate used in computing the level payments is raised for the rest of the
contract. Naturally, distortions can be even more blatant when the link between inflation
and interest rates is less clear, as is in the case of Venezuela.
For example the borrowers that signed an ARM in 1988 in Venezuela, had an initial
contract rate of 12.15 percent (10 percent as base rate plus 2.15 percent profit). At the first
adjustment date in 1989 as shown in table 4.5.1, the inflation (CPI) had risen to .84.5
percent but in spite of the clauses in the ARM contract, the 84.5 percent index increase was
not added to the 10 percent initial rate and the 2.15 percent margin to arrive at 96.65 percent
adjusted interest rate on the ARM for the second adjustment period. Instead, the lenders in
average just increased the mortgage rate to 18.96 percent. Table 4.5.1. and Figure 4.5.1
16 Franco Modigliani and Donald Lessard, 1975. Also Modigliani, unpublished
" Ibid, p 25
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clearly show that lately in Venezuela there has no been a clear link pattern between inflation
and interest rate
Figure 4.5 1 Mortgage Rates and Inflation
Mortgage Rates and Inflation
--- Mortgage Loans
I-u-Subsidized Loan
-- Inflation
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Table 4.5 1 Comparison of Market Rates, Subsidized Rates and Inflation
Year Mortgage Subsidized
Loans Loan
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
14.0
14.0
14.0
15.0
16.0
15.0
17.0
17.0
14.0
14.0
13.0
13.0
12.0
19.0
34.0
39.0
42.0
57.0
57.0
44.0
13.0
13.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
13.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
14.0
9.0
7.0
8.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
12.0
12.0
Inflation
7.4
7.1
6.9
12.8
22.9
16.0
8.5
5.8
12.1
11.4
11.6
28.1
29.5
84.5
40.7
34.2
31.4
38.1
60.8
59.9
Difference
Between Market
Rate and Inflation
6.6
6.9
7.1
2.2
-6.9
-1.0
8.5
11.2
1.9
2.6
1.4
-15.1
-17.5
-65.5
-6.7
4.8
10.6
18.9
-3.8
-1 5.9
4.5.4. The Graduated - Payment Mortgage (GPM):
The Graduated Payment Mortgage is based on a preestablished fixed interest rate and a
schedule of increasing monthly mortgage payments. The borrower makes up for the
GPM's low initial rates by accepting the addition of unpaid interest to the loan balance.
During the graduated payment period, the loan principal will increase rather than decrease
as it would normally do, resulting in negative amortization. This schedule of increasing
payments is followed regardless of economic conditions or the prevailing mortgage loan
rate.
The GPM solves the demand side of the problem by requiring relatively lower payments in
early years of the loan. Payments increase over time at a predetermined rate that may or
may not relate to the real rate of inflation. Its maturity is fixed.
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Difference Between
Subsidized Rate and
Inflation
5.6
5.9
5.1
-0.8
-10.9
-3.0
2.5
5.2
-1.1
2.6
-2.6
-21.1
-21.5
-77.5
-33.7
-27.2
-24.4
-31.1
-48.8
-47.9
One problem with GPM is that it could create high risks for both borrowers and lenders, if
the predetermined rate -which could be the expected rate of inflation- significantly varies
from the real rate of inflation. Other shortcoming of the GPM is that it does not solve the
supply problem stemming from financial intermediaries reliance on short term deposits as a
source of funds.
It seems evident that neither VRM nor GPM are comprehensive solutions to the problems
created by inflation and interest rates uncertainties. Each one is a partial answer that benefits
either the borrower or the lender, but at the expense of the other.
4.5.5 The Foreign Denomination Mortgage (FDM):
The Foreign Denomination Mortgage recovers the simplicity of the traditional mortgage by
denominating the principal and annual payments in a foreign currency, provided that the
foreign currency is "inflation proof', i.e. (a) low foreign inflation current and perspective -
and thus a low nominal long term rate; and (b) the nominal exchange rate roughly offsets
differentiated inflation (or that purchasing power parity is roughly maintained.
The advantage of this instrument is that a perceived strong foreign currency (e.g. the US
dollar in Venezuela) is widely accepted as a medium of payment. Operations denominated
in US dollars are well understood and thus would be relatively easy to implement. The
main disadvantage of this type of mortgage instrument is that the variability of the floating
bolivar per dollar exchange rate is high and does not seem to keep a stable short run relation
with domestic price and wage inflation.
4.5.6. The Price-Level-Adjusted Mortgage (PLAM)
Another alternative mortgage to the FPM is the price-level-adjusted-mortgage (PLAM) or
indexed mortgage which, by design, eliminates mortgage tilt, keeping payments fixed in
real terms. While not used in Venezuela, PLAMs are widespread in many countries,
particularly those with higher inflation. With a PLAM, the borrower makes a payment that
rises exactly with inflation or the country's price index (that is, payments in real terms are
constant). The initial payment is determined by Equation (4.2). However, the PLAM
payment is calculated on the basis of a real mortgage interest rate, which would prevail in
the absence of inflation
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Since payments and the outstanding principal are both indexed to inflation, the PLAM, in
effect, continuously refinances the original debt. Both the lender and the borrower are
unaffected by inflation.
In his book Urban Economics and Real Estate Markets, Prof. William Wheaton,
points three major objections that have blocked the use of PLAMs on many countries.
First, the negative amortization in nominal terms is considered a major problem. Two
decades of research on the determinants of mortgage default (failure of the borrower to
meet the mortgage payments) indicate that the most important factor is equity in the home.
As a result, mortgage lenders and investors are reluctant to consider a mortgage instrument
with negative amortization, particularly with low down payments. Second, homeownership
is largely viewed as a major savings vehicle. The home is the largest single asset of most
households, who may prefer an FPM, which promotes savings, rather than a PLAM,
which enhances current consumption. Finally, based on recent economic trends, there is
concern that incomes may not always keep pace with inflation, making it difficult to meet
the rising mortgage payments under the PLAM. On the other hand it could be argued that
the same is true with the FPM, whose nominal payment are constant.
4.5.7. The MIT Mortgage (MIT):
The MIT Mortgage avoids the risks of indexed instruments when financed by short term
deposits, such as PLAM. To do so, MIT uses as debiting rate a floating short term market
rate r,, as in VRM, but computes payments by spreading remaining debit balance at
constant real rate rr over remaining years. Thus the payment scheduled for any year t is M
(r, n - t), where M is the annuity needed to pay for the then outstanding debt at the rate r
and n - t years remaining to go (n is the initial maturity and t the years since the contract has
been in force). The difference r, - r controls the path of repayment. When r, = r, the
repayment is level in real terms and hence, in nominal terms it follows the same path as
PLAM. A larger r, causes faster amortization and payments decline in time. Since the ex
post real rate is not known there is some uncertainty in the real repayment path.
It should be remembered that the MIT mortgage is an alternative to PLAM when financed
by short term deposits, by guaranteeing lenders a market rate of return. PLAM does not
guarantee a interest rate but the real rate minus the actual return is p, r + i', not necessarily
= rt
4.5.8. The French Mortgage (FM):
* 46
The French Mortgage avoids the uncertainty of real repayment path of MIT by establishing
a floating maturity. It chooses as debiting rate a floating short term market nominal rate r,.
as in VRM or MIT. Payments are indexed as in PLAM. First payment is M ( r n ), and
subsequent payments in period t are M ( r, n ) * Pt. where Pt is price level at t relative to
Po. Periodically, payments are credited, while the ongoing balance is debited at debiting
rate R. Mortgage is paid off when net debt becomes zero. Therefore, maturity is floating.
If on the average r, = r+i or r = r, - i (or the chosen r = average ex post real rate) then the
mortgage is paid precisely at the original maturity, otherwise it may take somewhat longer
or shorter than n, i.e. effective life n has some uncertainty. In systems where r,*i has been
historically stable, differences from original life should not amount too much. One way of
diminishing the risk of exceeding the planned maturity n by choosing r larger than the
expected real rate tending to make payments faster.
The advantages of the FM are that one pays precisely the market rate as in MIT, but real
payment is constant as in PLAM. The disadvantages are (a) the uncertainty of the effective
maturity, and (b) possible financial distress if real wages decline since payment are fixed in
real terms.
4.5.9. The Mexican Dual Indexed Mortgage ( MM )
The MM works by adding to principal any difference in the accruing payment based on a
variable market interest rate and a payment rate initially set by the lender and adjusted
thereafter according to changes in wages (the minimum wage index). The evolution of the
Venezuelan minimum real wage is shown in Fig 4.5.2. Prior to 1975, the minimum wage
was increased to keep real wages constant. This link was cut in 1976 and since then, the
authorities have allowed the minimum real wage to decline significantly and rise in real
terms
Like instruments that rely on a wage index, with a MM real repayments are accelerated in
years when wages are rising relative to inflation, while in years when real wages are lower,
the loan is repaid more slowly. In principle, with this instrument it is the loan's maturity
date rather than its value that is uncertain. In practice, the analytical question becomes one
of setting an initial loan maturity schedule such that the loan terms provide for a sufficient
amount of possible maturity extension that any shortfalls in real payments can be
accommodated by term lengthening. As with the French mortgage, the risk of exceeding
the planned maturity can be controlled by choosing a higher payment rate.
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Figure 4.5 2 Deflated Minimum Wage
Deflated Minimum Wage
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After the first period, the payment is adjusted by the cumulative change in the wage
The required payment (that necessary to amortize the mortgage) is determined by a
over a market rate index R* = r* + p, where r* stands for the debiting real rate that
charged. If the borrower payment is less than the payment required to amortize the
index.
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the lender's interest rate, the difference is capitalizes (added to the principal balance). The
difference constitutes negative amortization (called interest "refinancing" in Mexico)".
By construction, the MM is a flexible term mortgage-if there is a balance outstanding at
the end of the original term, the term can be extended by either continuing the current
payment or changing the payment to that necessary to amortize the remaining balance over
the remaining term .
In Mexico, where this type of mortgage has been successfully applied, the original MM
design, had an initial term of 15 years and the term extension was 5 years. Any remaining
balance outstanding at the end of 20 years was forgiven by the lender who was reimbursed
by the government.
From a lender's perspective, the key characteristic of a MM is the negative amortization.
The greater the build up of negative amortization, the less cash the lender is receiving,
increasing the liquidity risk of the portfolio. Capitalizing the interest also increases the
duration of the loan. In addition, if the loan balance increases more rapidly than the house
prices, the borrower's equity could be eroded and the probability of default increased19 . In
the next section we will show the behavior of the outstanding balance of a MM applied to a
typical 63 square meter house.
This compound instrument has, for countries with severe inflation problems like
Venezuela, several advantages over all other mortgage designs. First, to avoid the financial
distress risk of PLAM, MM indexes payment to wage. Second, since payments are
calculated based on r*, it solves the demand effect of inflation by eliminating the tilting
effect of the real repayment schedule. And third, by offering an effective nominal return R*
= r* + p (or a real return = r*), it solves the supply side of the problem by attracting funds
that want to protect themselves from inflationary risks.
The disadvantage of MM is the uncertainty of its effective maturity, which becomes shorter
(longer) if wages rise faster (slower) than inflation.
' Lea and Bernstein, Ibid.
e Lea and Bernstein, Housing Finance in an inflationary economy. Journal of Housing Economics.
Article 183. p.8 .
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5. Simulation of Mortgage Designs
In this section, we offer some simple simulations of the performance of some of the
mortgages described in the previous section. These simulations provide a foundation for
understanding the effectiveness and insufficiencies of these instruments given different
market conditions. For this purpose, we will heavily rely throughout this section on work
done by the Ecuadorian Economist Rodolfo Baquerizo2 o
The simulations are supported on actual data for Venezuela over the past 20 years. Since an
important motivation for examining alternative mortgage instrument is to enhance the
affordability of homeownership, particularly for first-time homebuyer as well as the very
poor, we use estimates of house prices and household income facing first-time homebuyers
for the Venezuelan urban areas. Table 5.1.1 shows the conditions and assumptions put to
Figure 5.1 1 Conditions Used for Simulating Different Mortgages Designs
Nomenclature Conditions
Debiting Rate / Term
Effective Rate
FRM = Fixed Rate Mortgage 26% 20
VRM - Variable Rate Mortgage Variable 20
FDM - Foreign Denomination Mortgage 9% 20
PLAM = Price Level Adjusted Mortgage 5% 20
MIT - Massachusetts Institute of 5% / Inflation + 5%
Technology Mortgage
MM = Mexican Mortgage 5% (initial rate) Floating
Assumption: Borrower earns a fixed income equivalent to three Venezuelan
minimum salaries.
We examined the path of repayments of different mortgage loans. In addition to the Price
Level Indexed Mortgage PLAM and the Mexican Mortgage MM, we followed those
instruments mentioned in Section 4.5 (i.e., Fixed Rate Mortgage FRM, the Variable Rate
Mortgage VRM, and the Foreign Denomination Mortgage FDM.) This was done in
nominal and deflated terms. The repayment load on the mortgage holder's income was also
observed through the life of each mortgage. The idea was to assess over time the burden
that the borrower acquired with each type of mortgage instrument.
S 20 Baquerizo, Rodolfo. Inflation, Savings and Mortgage Financing: Problems and proposed solutions
for Ecuador, 1991.
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Finally, we evaluated the evolution through time of outstanding principals in each type
mortgage. Again, this was done in nominal and deflated terms. The purpose of this
exercise was to determine what instruments required a higher amortization in the early years
of the contract. Evidently, the higher the initial amortization, the harder it is to service a
loan in the beginning, presumably when young home buyers earn their lowest incomes.
The loan to value ratio was also observed to determine if the credit risk assumed by lenders
in indexed operations increased over time.
We did not simulate the French Mortgage, because as it was explained in Section 4.6 (and
the VRM simulation made obvious,) these are not viable solutions for Venezuela given its
negative real interest rates. Table 5.1.1 presents the data that was used as basis for the
simulations. The exchange rate data stands for bolivares per US dollar. Passive interest rate
are on savings accounts, while active interest rates are on mortgage loans made by
mortgage banks and Savings and Loan Institutions.
With Foreign Denomination instruments, we always mean those denominated in US
dollars. For this purpose, we used data on a standard low-middle income home.
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Table 5.1 1 Historic Data Used in Simulations
Year CPI MIN. Wage (Bs.) US X-Rate Interest on Interest on Discount Model House inflation %
Savings % Loans % * Rate % Selling Price (Bs.)
1976 100.0 450 4.3 12 14 7 51000 7.38
1977 107.1 450 4.3 12 14 7 54626 7.11
1978 114.5 450 4.3 12 14 7.5 58372 6.86
1979 129.1 450 4.3 12 15 11 65865 12.84
1980 158.8 900 4.3 14 16 13 80972 22.94
1981 184.1 900 4.3 13 15 14 93903 15.97
1982 199.8 900 4.3 15 17 13 101879 8.49
1983 211.4 900 4.78 14 17 11 107801 5.81
1984 237.0 900 6.4 13 14 11 120000 12.11
1985 264.0 1200 7.03 11 14 8 155000 11.40
1986 294.5 1200 9.16 10 13 8 150000 11.58
1987 377.3 2010 12.98 10 13 8 172000 28.08
1988 488.4 2010 12.22 10 12 8 200000 29.46
1989 900.9 4000 38.74 30 19 45 200000 84.47
1990 1267.3 4000 47.44 29 34 43 490000 40.66
1991 1700.7 6000 56.82 33 39 40 590000 34.20
1992 2235.3 9000 68.38 37 42 42 780000 31.43
1993 3087.4 15000 90.83 51 57 61 954000 38.12
1994 4964.9 24000 148.5 39 57 55 1300000 60.81
1995 7939.1 31000 170/460" 24 44 40 3780000 59.90
Although this is the current market rate, we did not use it in the simulations because in many opportunities it offered negative returns when compared with inflation.
HISTORIC DATA INDEXES
Year CPI Minimum Minimum Minimum Wage US $ US S Over Model House
Wage Wage Over Over X-Rate Exchange CPI Selling Price
CPi Rate
1976 100 100 100 100.0 100 100 100
1977 107 100 93 100.0 100 93 107
1978 114 100 87 100.0 100 87 114
1979 129 100 77 100.0 100 77 129
1980 159 200 126 200.0 100 63 159
1981 184 200 109 200.0 100 54 184
1982 200 200 100 200.0 100 50 200
1983 211 200 95 179.9 111 53 211
1984 237 200 84 134.4 149 63 235
1985 264 267 101 163.1 163 62 304
1986 295 267 91 125.2 213 72 294
1987 377 447 118 148.0 302 80 337
1988 488 447 91 157.2 284 58 392
1989 901 447 50 49.6 901 100 392
1990 1267 889 70 80.6 1103 87 961
1991 1701 1333 78 100.9 1321 78 1157
1992 2235 2000 89 125.8 1590 71 1529
1993 3087 3333 108 157.8 2112 68 1871
1994 4965 5333 107 154.4 3453 70 2549
1995 7939 6889 87 64.4 10698 135 7412
During 1995 the official rate was Bs1 70/US$ and the market rate was Bs 460/US$ in average
0
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5.2 Simulation of Mortgage RepaymentsSimulation 5.2.1 compares the payment
pattern of various mortgage instruments, i.e. FRM, VRM, FDM, MM and PLAM. The
original loan of Bs. 40,800, represents 80% of the value of a 63 sq. mt standard low-
middle income sold in Venezuela since 198422
Simulation 5.2 1 Nominal Payment Pattern of Mortgages
YEAR FRM VRM FDM PLAM MM MIT
76 10713 5720 4469 3515 3596 3274
77 10713 5697 4469 3765 3596 3523
78 10713 5623 4469 4024 3596 3823
79 10713 7765 4469 4540 3596 4047
80 10713 11525 4469 5581 7193 4588
81 10713 8848 4469 6473 7193 5686
82 10713 6362 4469 7023 7193 6639
83 10713 5640 4968 7431 7193 7233
84 10713 7600 6652 8331 7193 7679
85 10713 7313 7307 9280 9590 8670
86 10713 7413 9521 10355 9590 9734
87 10713 12241 13492 13262 16064 10959
88 10713 12385 12702 17169 16064 14342
89 10713 29012 40267 31673 31968 19062
90 10713 15622 49310 44552 31968 37417
91 10713 14625 59060 59788 47952 55256
92 10713 14592 71075 78582 71928 78330
93 10713 16865 94410 108538 119880 110389
94 10713 22433 154353 174541 191808 172025
95 10713 26234 478132 279098 247752 376266
For FRM, we used 26% that stands for the average inflation rate over the last twenty years.
This could not have been predictable in 1976 when Venezuela was a very low inflation
country, but this is the advantage of doing simulations. The main purpose of this exercise
is to illustrate the "tilt" effect caused by inflation, which increases real payment during the
early years of the mortgage. VRM charged the current one-year mortgage rate during each
year of the simulation. FDM's rate was a fixed 9 percent which was the average US
mortgage rate for the period. PLAM and MM charged a fixed 5 percent on top of the
monetary correction. However, MM required a constant payment as percentage (25
percent) of a three-minimum-salary income. Simulation 5.2.2 presents the same, but
deflated results.
22 In the absence of real data, selling prices from 1.976 to 1.984 were calculated deflacting 1.984's real
prices.
* 53
Simulation 5.2 2 Deflated Payment Pattern
YEAR FRM VRM FDM PLAM MM MIT
1976 10713 5720 4469 3515 3596 3274
1977 10002 5319 4173 3515 3358 3289
1978 9360 4913 3905 3515 3142 3340
1979 8295 6013 3461 3515 2785 3134
1980 6748 7259 2815 3515 4530 2890
1981 5819 4805 2427 3515 3907 3088
1982 5363 3185 2237 3515 3601 3323
1983 5068 2668 2351 3515 3403 3422
1984 4521 3207 2807 3515 3035 3240
1985 4058 2770 2768 3515 3633 3284
1986 3637 2517 3232 3515 3256 3305
1987 2840 3245 3576 3515 4258 2905
1988 2194 2536 2601 3515 3289 2937
1989 1189 3220 4469 3515 3548 2116
1990 845 1233 3891 3515 2523 2953
1991 630 860 3473 3515 2820 3249
1992 479 653 3180 3515 3218 3504
1993 347 546 3058 3515 3883 3575
1994 216 452 3109 3515 3863 3465
1995 135 330 6022 3515 3121 4739
On Figures 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.-- we can observe the differences between the various
mortgage lending patterns. While in nominal terms, FRM remained constant at Bs. 12,705,
PLAM, MM and FDM started at a much lower level (around Bs. 4100), but rose
considerably at the end. This monetary illusion refrain many borrowers from wanting to
contract in real rather than in nominal terms.
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Figure 5.2 1 Nominal Payment Pattern
Nominal Payment Pattern
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However, when one examines the deflated results shown in figure 5.2.2, it is clear that in
real terms, that FRM and VRM have a declining slope that represents a decreasing payment
load to the borrower. Just the opposite to what is needed for first time buyers who need
lower payment at the beginning and could cope with larger nominal payments later in life.
FDM, PLAM and MM have each a peculiar trajectory that reflects the dramatic rise of
inflation, the fall in real wages and the various sharp devaluations occurred in Venezuela
during the last 10 years.
The mortgage design that better copes with this situation is MM, because thanks to its
floating maturity, MM's capital can be indexed to prices as in PLAM (to guarantee lenders a
real positive return), while repayments are indexed to wages to guarantee borrowers a
constant payment load 21 MM real payments increase when there is a rise in real wage,
however, since this real payment increase did not change the payment load, it did not
23 Baqueriso Ibid. p. 78
* The payment load is defined as the mortgage payment as percentage of income.
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burden the borrower any more than before, except in terms of the length of time to
maturity.
Figure 5.2 2 Deflated Payment Pattern
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The FDM pattern reflects the deflected fluctuations of the value of the US dollar. The
problem with FDM is that the US dollar is not directly related to Venezuelan prices or
wages, which creates wide swings in real payments. US dollar operations do not guarantee
lenders a real return in bolivares, nor a constant payment load.
It is also clear that the VRM does not eliminate the "tilt" effect induced by inflation. The
difficulty is essentially that a nominal interest rate rather than the price level is used at each
point in time to calculate the payment. The VRM is similar to the standard mortgage in this
respect. Simulation 5.2.3 shows the payments load incurred by borrowers with each
mortgage design over time.
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Simulation 5.2 3 Annual Payment to Annual Income Ratio
ANNUAL PAYMENT TO ANNUAL INCOME RATIO
YEAR FRM VRM EPM PLAM MM MJT
1976 66 35 28 22 22 20
1977 66 35 28 23 22 22
1978 66 35 28 25 22 24
1979 66 48 28 28 22 25
1980 33 36 14 17 22 14
1981 33 27 14 20 22 18
1982 33 20 14 22 22 20
1983 33 17 15 23 22 22
1984 33 23 21 26 22 24
1985 25 17 17 21 22 20
1986 25 17 22 24 22 23
1987 15 17 19 18 22 15
1988 15 17 18 24 22 20
1989 7 20 28 22 22 13
1990 7 11 34 31 22 26
1991 5 7 27 28 22 26
1992 3 5 22 24 22 24
1993 2 3 17 20 22 20
1994 1 3 18 20 22 20
1995 1 2 43 25 22 34
Observe that for the same loan amount, early payments for FRM and VRM can be up to
three times as burdensome as those of FDM, PLAM, or MM. This makes the FRM and
VRM to rate poorly from the borrower point of view with respect to the risk dimension and
makes housing much less accessible, even if FRM borrower know that in some years their
payment will be practically zero. This phenomenon is called the "tilt effect". Simulation
5.2.4 depicts it graphically.
In the case of FRM a constant nominal payment accompanied by anticipation of inflation
necessarily implies an ex ante stream of declining real payments. Consequently, the initial
payment must be high so as to make up for this "tilt" effect and maintain at issuance a given
real present value for the mortgage. Because the initial payment is high, the initial ratio of
payment to income is high for the borrower in a period of anticipated inflation. Such a
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design is likely to produce cash flow difficulties for the borrower" if compared with any
indexed mortgage design such as PLAM or MM.
Simulation 5.2 4 FRM Payments: "Tilt" Effect
FRM Payments: "Tilt Effect"
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How much more difficult ? How much more house can one buy with an indexed mortgage
instrument? Simulation 5.2.5 illustrates the answer to these questions. The example is
based on a monthly income of Bs. 16200 (3 minimum salaries as of December, 1976). The
payment load ratio is 25 percent, and the loan is equivalent to 80 percent of the value of the
house.
Simulation 5.2 5 How Much House could a Family Buy in 1976 ?
How Much House Could a Family Buy in 1976 ?
With an annual income of Bs. 1 6,200
Payment-to-income ratio of 0.25
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P44 MRT
the following annual interest rates:
26% (average inflation for the period 1976-1995)
14% (Mortgage rate in Venezuela in 1976)
9% (average mortgage rate in the US between 1976 and 1995)
5% (on top of monetary correction)
7% payment factor - Variable Discount Rate 1976-1995
2 5 Cohn-Fischer, Alternative Mortage Designs in New Mortgage Designs for an Inflationary
Environment, p.62
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The results are striking. Due to the average high nominal rates prevalent in Venezuela for
the period 1976-1995, the capacity of a family to acquire a house has been considerably
reduced. The introduction of indexed mortgage like PLAM, MM or MIT would not only
guarantee lenders a positive real return and borrowers an affordable payment load, but it
would also increase a family's power to buy a house as much as three times.
In brief, MM's and MIT repayment paths are the most attractive for two reasons. First, in
the case of MM it remains constant as a percentage of income over the life of the mortgage.
In the case of MIT a desirable path can be achieved by an appropriate choice of the payment
rate. In our example without any variation for 20 years on the chosen 7% payment rate, the
outstanding loan balance at the end of the term (20 years) accounted for as little as 1.39%
of the original loan which represented just 1.13% of the income of a three minimum wage
earning family. By keeping the "spreading" rate low, basically at the same level in the
interest rate in absence of inflation (the real rate) all of these instruments eliminates the
inconveniences of the tilt effect suffered by FRM and VRM. This last quality allows
families to circumvent the hardship brought by inflation and thus to acquire a better home
26
5.2.2 The Very Poor
In section 4.4.1 we indicated that in spite of the opinion of some World Bank experts, we
would try to determine through simulations, the possibility that low income people could
amortize a loan at market interest rates if supported with a direct subsidy to the housing
cost.
Typically in the absence of inflation it is possible for a family to pay a 2.5 times yearly
income loan by earmarking 25% of its income for 20 years. Nevertheless when the
monthly family earnings is inferior to 3 minimum salaries, the income share that can be
reserved to housing expenses is much smaller because other payments take priority over
shelter expenditure. Housing can be considered a marginal expense in the sense that only
after other more important living necessities are covered, can a family think about paying
rent or amortization over a loan.
In Venezuela the increasing inflation and the fall in real wages have made it impossible for a
family with less than 3 minimum salaries income to afford more than 10% of its paycheck
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9 26 Baqueriso, Ibid, p82 .
to housing expenses or contribute savings for more than 10% downpayment for buying a
house.
Now, as indicated by Professor Franco Modigliani while mortgages requiring only 10% or
5% downpayment significantly reduce the upfront cash required, they also raise the size of
the loan and therefore the annual housing expenses, increasing the minimum income
required to qualify for the loan.
Different countries have tried different approaches to fulfill this income limitation. In
Venezuela for example, the government has opted for a subsidy to interest rates. Other
countries have preferred direct subsidy to housing costs. A third way has consisted on
applying different mortgages systems designed to reduce the negative impact of inflation on
the affordability of house and finally one could also think about a combination of previous
approaches.
Let us assume that families with an income of two minimum salaries can only afford to
contribute with a 10% downpayment and 10% of income share to amortizing a housing
loan. Then the maximum loan amount that can be afforded by these income class people
will depend upon the term of the mortgage
Simulation 5.2.7 shows the maximum amount that these families can borrow and how
much subsidy is needed under different approaches to make possible that a low income
family (2 minimum monthly salaries) can amortize a 2.5 yearly earnings house with 10%
downpayment and 10% monthly income payment at least for the first three years.
Simulation 5.2.6 shows the nominal payment pattern necessary to amortize the loan in 20
years.
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Simulation 5.2 6 Nominal Payment Pattern for a Low Income Family
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Simulation 5.2 7 Subsidy Required under different mortgage designs
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It is clear from the graphic that FRM requires almost two times as much (86% vs. 49%)
subsidy allowance as the one required by DIM to make possible that a 2 minimum wages
income family can afford to buy a 2.5 yearly income house with 10% downpayment and
10% monthly payment.
During the past two decades, the Venezuelan Housing authorities have subsidized interest
rate by lending money at a fixed 8% interest rate for 20 years. This policy have helped
families with income up to 6 minimum wages per month to buy their houses. However, as
always occurs in these situations, the funds available for this purpose is much smaller than
the demand and just a relatively modest group benefits from this "cheap" loans.
We have seen through simulations 5.2.5 that families with at least 3 minimum wages of
monthly income can afford to buy a 2.5 yearly income house and amortize it in 20 years
paying the outstanding loan balance with 22% of their income.
Assuming that only families with less than 3 minimum wages a months are unable to set
aside 25% of their income for housing expenses, and taking for granted that they can afford
to earmark 10% of their income for this purpose, one can readily see the following.
First it is possible to eliminate the interest rate subsidy to families with more than 3
minimum wages income without changing their payment load. It was shown through
simulation 5.3.1 that it is possible to amortize a 72 minimum salaries loan (80% of price of
the house) by paying during 17 years 25% of the family's income. In this sense the
borrowers will not notice the interest rate subsidy elimination because they will continue to
pay the same income percentage (not the same amount).
Second for families with less than 3 minimum wages income it is possible to reduce the
implicit subsidy from 86 percent contemplated in FRM to 49 percent (almost half)
considered in DIM, without increasing the monthly payments to more than 10% income at
least during the first three years.
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5.3. Simulation of Outstanding Balances
One observation that is frequently made is that the balance of indexed mortgages grows in
time. This raises two types of questions. The first one, from borrowers, is that if the
outstanding balance grows, when does one finish to amortize it ? The second one, from
lenders, is regarding their credit risk. Does the remaining principal ever grow above the
value of the property? If it did, borrowers with indexed mortgages could be tempted to stop
servicing their debts, creating risks and costs to lenders.
Simulation 5.3.1 illustrates the outstanding balances of different mortgages in nominal
terms. As it was explained in Section 4.4, the remaining balances of indexed mortgages
indeed rises initially. This trend continues as long as the "price effects " outweighs the
"quantity effect" (in the beginning, the amortization of capital is not enough to offset the
monetary correction.).
Simulation 5.3 1 Nominal Outstanding Balance
NOMINAL OUTSTANDING BALANCES
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n the Venezuelan case, the nominal remaining balances of FRM and VRM declined
consistently over time. FDM's balances declined until .83 when the US dollar strongly
appreciated vis a vis the bolivar, rising thereafter until the last years of the mortgage.
. 63
PLAM increased consistently until the end of the contract, showing the persistent inflation
that pervaded Venezuela during this period. MM's balances rose along with PLAM until
1980, when there was a large hike in real wages. Thereafter, the balance leveled until 1990
when it rose due to a sharp fall in real wage but after "quantity effect" prevailed and MM's
balances fell until 1992, when the mortgage was fully amortized. However. these are only
nominal results and therefore convey an illusory picture. Simulation 5.3.2 presents the
same outstanding balances but in deflated terms2".
Simulation 5.3 2 Deflated Outstanding Balance
DEFLATED OUTSTANDING BALANCES
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It is clear from these results that in real terms, all mortgage instruments had declining
balances over time. The main difference is that FRM, VRM and FDM initially had a much
steeper slope than PLAM or MM. This means that FRM, VRM and FDM required a larger
real amortization of capital in the early years. Obviously, the higher the initial amortization,
the heavier the burden on the borrower. This situation is more clearly illustrated by
Simulation 5.3.3.
" The numerical data for these simulation is presented in appendix 1.
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Simulation 5.3 3 FRM vs. PLAM Payments
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It is clear that due to high nominal rates, FRM initially requires larger real amortization than
PLAM does. This makes the process of buying a house with FRM more difficult than with
an indexed mortgage instrument like PLAM or MM.
Going back to MM, it was interesting to observe that because of the real increase in wages,
its floating maturity ended up being shorter than originally expected. As it can be seen in
Appendix I, MM were " pre-paid" for all periods longer than fourteen years ! For shorter
periods, there were no delays in real amortization in relation to PLAM, notwithstanding real
wage declines in the last couple of years. The results of the short-period simulations are
only partial and can not be taken as predictors of what will be the actual maturity of the
mortgage. This will depend on those changes in the level of real wages that take place in the
next few years.
It is important to understand that if wages decline beneath their low current level the
maturity of MM will extend beyond schedule. The floating maturity moves only because of
changes in real wages, and not because of their absolute level. Once real wages stabilized at
any level, maturities would not be lengthened or shortened..
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An optimistic outlook, on the other hand, would argue that wages will catch up, as they
have always done. An increase in real wages over the next few years would reverse the
current delay in amortization, and actual maturities would occur as originally expected.
The second concern mentioned at the beginning of this section comes from lenders
regarding their credit risk, and in particular the possibility that the remaining principal might
grow above the value of the property. If it did, borrowers with indexed mortgages could be
tempted to stop servicing their debts, creating risks and costs to lenders.
In assessing the risks associated with negative amortization it may be less important to
consider the loan balance over time than the loan balance compared to the value of the
home. Many studies of mortgage default indicate that borrower equity is an important
determinant of default --the more equity the borrower has the less likely is default"
To address this issue, it was necessary to find a house that had verifiable and recorded
market values over the last twenty years. Unfortunately, the largest housing developer of
Venezuela, Ciudad Residencial La Rosa, had sold a standard house over a period of just 11
years (1984-1995) for which there was information available. For the period 1976 to 1983
we simply deflated the real price of "Model La Rosa". The selling price of "Model La
Rosa" has been widely advertised, and is included in thousands of mortgage contracts
written over the years. We used the selling price of new 63 square meters "Model la Rosa"
as a proxy of the market value of all "La Rosa". Although, this approach does not account
for depreciation which overvalues older houses, it neither considers the appreciation that
comes from living in settled and better serviced areas, which has the opposite effect.
Table 5.3.1 presents the selling price of Model House that we use as proxy of the market
value of any model house for each year since 1984.
2 Modigliani, Franco. Unpublished
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Selling Price of Model House
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Nominal Price
51000
54626
58372
65865
80972
93903
101879
107801
120000
155000
150000
172000
200000
200000
490000
590000
780000
954000
1300000
3780000
Deflated Price
51000
51000
51000
51000
51000
51000
51000
51000
50640
58716
50925
45593
40951
22199
38665
34691
34895
30899
26184
47612
Nominal
100
107
114
129
159
184
200
211
235
304
294
337
392
392
961
1157
1529
1871
2549
7412
* In the absence of real data, selling prices from 1976 to 1984 were calculated deflecting 1 984's real prices.
From 1984 to 1995 selling prices correspond to real prices.
It is interesting to observe in Figure 5.3.1. that, notwithstanding increasing nominal prices,
the deflated values decreased in relation to 1984 prices. Note that real prices were highest in
1985, when there was an increase in real wages. In the same way, real prices were lowest
in 1989, when real wages fell to their lowest level since 1984.
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Deflated
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
115
100
89
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44
76
68
68
61
51
93
Table 5.3 1
Figure 5.3 1 Comparison of Deflated Selling Price to Real Wages
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By dividing the results presented in Simulation 5.2.1 (nominal remaining balances) by the
bolivar values in Table 5.3.1, one obtains the "Outstanding Balance to Value" ratio.
Simulation 5.3.4 presents these results. The ratio was assumed to be 80 percent initially, or
in other words, that the borrower paid 20 percent down. interestingly enough, the
remaining debt was never larger than the value of the house in any of our simulations.
These results are evidence to reject the notion that risks incurred by lenders would unduly
increase with the introduction of instruments like MM. Lenders would still assume some
risks -for which they are compensated- but those risks would not be any larger than those
assumed in the absence of inflation which correspond to PLAM contracts.
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Simulation 5.3 4 Outstanding Balances to Value Ratio
Year FRM VRM FDM PLAM MM MIT
1976 80 80 80 79 80 83
1977 74 74 73 76 77 81
1978 69 69 67 74 75 78
1979 61 61 58 71 69 75
1980 49 49 46 68 62 73
1981 42 42 38 65 60 70
1982 38 38 34 61 60 67
1983 36 36 35 58 58 63
1984 32 32 40 55 52 60
1985 24 24 32 44 42 48
1986 24 24 41 46 44 52
1987 20 20 47 47 39 54
1988 17 16 35 47 37 55
1989 15 15 101 76 42 95
1990 6 6 45 37 26 49
1991 4 4 39 34 26 47
1992 3 3 30 26 21 39
1993 2 2 25 20 16 34
1994 1 1 21 12 8 28
1995 0 0 12 0 0 6
show that MIT and Mexican Mortgage MM are clearly the best
alternative for Venezuela as long as it suffers from a
efficient capital markets. The introduction of indexed
mitigate the negative effects of high inflation, while
Venezuelan capital markets.
double digit inflation, and lacks
securities, such as MM, would
promoting the strengthening of
Alternative instruments prove to be only partial solutions, insufficient to correct
Venezuela's severe distortions. The Variable Rate Mortgage VRM while eliminates the
mismatch of maturities problem, does not solve the tilt problem due to high nominal rates.
The Graduated Payment Mortgage solves the tilt problem by requiring lower initial
payments, but it creates high return risk to lenders and mismatch of maturities risk for
e 69
5.4 Recapitulation
The simulations below
intermediaries. MIT and MM solve the demand and supply sides of the problem and adapt
nicely to the distortions of the Venezuelan reality. Naturally, as our capital markets develop
and inflation subsides, some of the alternatives mentioned above will become more
attractive. and lenders and borrowers will be free to choose the one that adjusts best to their
preferences and risk aversions.
o 70
6. Conclusions
This thesis has aimed to go beyond to the mere description of various mortgages (FRM,
VRM, FDM, PLAM, MM, MIT) as interesting financial instruments. Through an analysis
of their performance in the case of Venezuela during the period 1976 to 1995, we have
been able to look at the relative advantages and disadvantages of these instruments.
e The first and more important conclusion is that fortunately for the young Venezuelan
first time buyer, there are at least two mortgage designs that can be immediately
implemented to enhance their affordability now constrained by the mortgage designs in
use in Venezuela . These are MIT and Mexican Mortgages.
* Considering that potential buyers have different combinations of size, age, savings and
income, no single mortgage design will universally improve affordability. Each
mortgage has advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of borrowers and
lenders. Various mortgages are better and worse at addressing the downpayment and
income constrains associated with qualifying for a mortgage.
On balance, Mexican Mortgage proved to be the best alternative mortgage design to be
used during wild inflationary periods like the one Venezuela is going through these
days. By creating a new standard of deferred payments, it is capable of restoring the
operation of mortgage loans that by design deal in long term contracts.
* Mexican Mortgage demonstrated considerable merit as a technique to guard against
unintended increase in real payments induced by inflation, guaranteeing to the lender
and the borrowers to be an appropriate hedge from inflation. As a result of these
benefits, Mexican Mortgage makes it easier for the housing financing sector to function
during long and rapid inflation periods.
* Fixed Rate Mortgage and Variable Rate Mortgage performed poorly from the borrowers
point of view under inflationary environment, causing a sharp rise in the initial monthly
payments of the households.
* Lenders should assign more importance to the value of the house compared to the value
of the loan balance, than the potential negative amortization that usually occurs with
Mexican Mortgage.
* The PLAM, Mexican and MIT clearly correct the mortgage tilt problem of the FRM and
VRM. The fact that the Mexican and MIT mortgages are linked to a nominal short-term
rate is a clear advantage over the PLAM. The flexibility of the MIT mortgage offering
as much or as little tilt as desired permits the borrowers and lenders to trade off the
safety of declining real payments with lower, more affordable initial payments and
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increasing the size of the mortgage that the borrower can qualify for. This is a clear
advantage of MIT mortgage over the Mexican mortgage.
MIT and Mexican Mortgage proved to be good substitutes for loans interest subsidies
granted by the Housing Policy Law. The benefits of better housing finance systems are
both direct and indirect. The direct effect is that better market based systems for the
majority who under MIT and Mexican Mortgages can pay, will free public resources
for support of the poorest households. Indirectly, a more efficient and abundant supply
of housing will stabilize housing rents on the rental market.
* Since MIT and Mexican Mortgage are tied to a nominal short-term rate, mortgage banks
and savings and loan institutions can attract savers and investors into housing and
urban capital which are some of the safest and least risky assets in the economy.
* Clearly, better housing finance will improve the efficiency and stability of housing and
urban investment. As is well known, the availability of financing is the critical factor in
housing development projects. Particularly in Venezuela the striking physical
differences observable across neighborhoods in the same city reflects the nature of their
financing affordability or the lack of it.
e There are many directions in which this research might be extended. The different
mortgages designs could be simulated for households with different incomes, down
payments and real rates, because the effects of inflation depend on these variables. Also
it is possible to simulate the combination of two mortgage designs that further enhance
the affordability and safety of the payments for both the lender and the borrower and at
the same time speed up the maturity of the loan.
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Rate of 26%
(1)
Year Outstanding
Principal
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
40800
40695
40562
40395
40184
39919
39584
39163
38632
37963
37120
36057
34719
33033
30908
28230
24857
20606
15251
8503
(2)
Time to
Maturity
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
(3) (4)
Nominal Total
Rate Annual
Payment
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
0.26 10713
(5)
Interest
Charged
10608
10581
10546
10503
10448
10379
10292
10182
10044
9870
9651
9375
9027
8588
8036
7340
6463
5358
3965
2211
(6)
Amortization
(4) - (5)
105
133
167
211
265
334
421
531
669
843
1062
1338
1686
2125
2677
3373
4251
5356
6748
8503
(7) (8) (9)
Principal Year Fkntibb)-Year ElibflAtET
(6) Deflator (7)/(9)
40695
40562
40395
40184
39919
39584
39163
38632
37963
37120
36057
34719
33033
30908
28230
24857
20606
15251
8503
0
40695
37870
35293
31115
25143
21499
19605
18276
16020
14061
12242
9203
6764
3431
2228
1462
922
494
171
0
100.0
107.1
114.5
129.1
158.8
184.1
199.8
211.4
237.0
264.0
294.5
377.3
488.4
900.9
1267.3
1700.7
2235.3
3087.4
4964.9
7939.1
Nominal Rate 26% = Average Inflation for the period 1976-1995
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(10)
Payment
Over
Deflator
(4)/(9)*100
10713
10002
9360
8295
6748
5819
5363
5068
4521
4058
3637
2840
2194
1189
845
630
479
347
216
135
Performance Of a 20 Year-FRM beoinina in 1976 with a Pavment
* Nominal rate is calculated from Fisher Law i=(1+real)(1+inflation)-1
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Performance of a 20-year FDM begining in 1976 with a Payment
Rate of 9%*
Year Outstanding Outstanding Interest Time to Payment in Payment
Balance in US $ Balance in Bs. Rate Maturity US_$ in Bs.
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
9488
9303
9101
8880
8640
8378
8093
7782
7443
7073
6671
6232
5753
5231
4663
4043
3367
2631
1828
954
40800
40002
39133
38186
37153
36027
34800
33463
35577
45270
46894
57081
74674
63927
180635
191799
191337
179913
166078
141609
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
1039
4469
4469
4469
4469
4469
4469
4469
4968
6652
7307
9521
13492
12702
40267
49310
59060
71075
94410
154353
478132
Interest
Charged in
US $
854
837
819
799
778
754
728
700
670
637
600
561
518
471
420
364
303
237
165
86
Amortization Principal Year
in US $ End in US$
185
202
220
240
262
285
311
339
370
403
439
479
522
569
620
676
736
803
875
954
9303
9101
8880
8640
8378
8093
7782
7443
7073
6671
6232
5753
5231
4663
4043
3367
2631
1828
954
0
Principal
Year End
in Bs.
40002
39133
38186
37153
36027
34800
33463
35577
45270
46894
57081
74674
63927
180635
191799
191337
179913
166078
141609
0
X- Rate
Bs/$
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.78
6.4
7.03
9.16
12.98
12.22
38.74
47.44
56.82
68.38
90.83
148.5
176.6
/460*
Deflator
100
107
114
129
159
184
200
211
237
264
295
377
488
901
1267
1701
2235
3087
4965
7939
Payment
over
Deflator
in Bs.
4469
4173
3905
3461
2815
2427
2237
2351
2807
2768
3232
3576
2601
4469
3891
3473
3180
3058
3109
6022
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Principal at Payment at OLB at end Rate of,
end of period end of period of period C-D. interest
year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Principal at,
start of
period
40800
42486
44016
45363
49205
57934
64072
65968
65861
69197
71659
73600
85716
99348
160761
192885
212006
213998
201818
166230
40295
41741
43011
46646
54909
60713
62492
62371
65505
67805
69603
81003
93799
151597
181579
199063
200066
187039
150003
0
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
principaI Principal Payment in
adiustment 1976
bolivares
interest
charged
2191
2275
2352
2559
3025
3359
3476
3490
3692
3854
3998
4713
5548
9163
11307
12943
13932
14779
16227
13290
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
3515
43811
45506
47035
51186
60491
67186
69515
69802
73836
77085
79957
94265
110968
183270
226131
258852
278647
295577
324544
265807
3515
3765
4024
4540
5581
6473
7023
7431
8331
9280
10355
13262
17169
31673
44552
59788
78582
108538
174541
279098
Time to Deflator
Maturity
inflation
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.13
0.23
0.16
0.08
0.06
0.12
0.11
0.12
0.28
0.29
0.84
0.41
0.34
0.31
0.38
0.61
0.60
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100
107
114
129
159
184
200
211
237
264
295
377
488
901
1267
1701
2235
3087
4965
7939
1325
1490
1672
1981
2557
3114
3547
3941
4639
5426
6357
8549
11621
22509
33245
46846
64650
93760
158314
265807
3011
3020
3019
5823
11286
9252
5442
3834
7974
7888
8298
20665
25252
83922
65370
65966
66641
81579
122726
99578
Performance of a 20-Year Mexican Mortgage begining in 1976 with a Payment Rate of
inflation plus 5 percent and Payment equal to 22% of annual income
Year Outstanding Time to Rate Total Interest Amortization Principal Principal Year Annual Deflator Payment
Principal Maturity Annual Charged Year End End over Income over
Payment Deflator Deflator
1976 40800 20 0.12 3564 5051 -1487 42287 42287 16200 100 3596
1977 42287 19 0.12 -3564 5120 -1556 43843 40933 16200 107 3358
1978 43843 18 0.12 3564 5199 -1635 45478 39735 16200 114 3142
1979 45478 17 0.18 3564 8112 -4548 50026 38736 16200 129 2785
1980 50026 16 0.28 7128 13975 -6847 56873 35822 32400 159 4530
1981 56873 15 0.21 7128 11926 -4798 61672 33495 32400 184 3907
1982 61672 14 0.13 7128 8322 -1194 62866 31470 32400 200 3601
1983 62866 13 0.11 7128 6797 331 62535 29585 32400 211 3403
1984 62535 12 0.17 7128 10698 -3570 66105 27896 32400 237 3035
1985 66105 11 0.16 9504 10841 -1337 67443 25548 43200 264 3633
1986 67443 10 0.17 9504 11182 -1678 69120 23466 43200 295 3256
1987 69120 9 0.33 15919 22863 -6944 76064 20163 72360 377 4258
1988 76064 8 0.34 15919 26212 -10292 86357 17682 72360 488 3289
1989 86357 7 0.89 31680 77266 -45586 131943 14645 144000 901 3548
1990 131943 6 0.46 31680 60249 -28569 160512 12666 144000 1267 2523
1991 160512 5 0.39 47520 62920 -15400 175913 10343 216000 1701 2820
1992 175913 4 0.36 71280 64092 7188 168724 7548 324000 2235 3218
1993 168724 3 0.43 118800 72756 46044 122680 3974 540000 3087 3883
1994 122680 2 0.66 190080 80737 109343 13337 269 864000 4965 3863
1995 13337 1 0.65 245520 8656 236864 0 0 1116000 7939 3121
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Performance of a 20-Year MIT begining in 1976 with a Payment Rate of 5 percent
.1.
Outstanding
Principal
40800
42577
44210
45629
49721
59024
65715
67943
68057
72022
75163
77892
92697
110299
189925
239233
277756
300623
319867
358349
Year L
Payment
Factor
0.08024
0.08274
0.08647
0.08869
0.09227
0.09634
0.10102
0.10645
0.11283
0.12038
0.12950
0.14069
0.15472
0.17282
0.19701
0.23097
0.28201
0.36720
0.53780
1.05000
.3)
Total
Annual
Payment,
3274
3523
3823
4047
4588
5686
6639
7233
7679
8670
9734
10959
14342
19062
37417
55256
78330
110389
172025
376266
(4).
Efective
Interest
rate
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.18
0.28
0.21
0.13
0.11
0.17
0.16
0.17
0.33
0.34
0.89
0.46
0.39
0.36
0.43
0.66
0.65
.5.
Interest
Charged
5050.7
5155.6
5242.6
8138.7
13890.0
12377.3
8867.7
7346.4
11643.0
11811.6
12462.0
25764.4
31943.4
98688.1
86725.1
93778.6
101196.9
129633.0
210506.2
232581.2
Amortization
(3)-(5)
-1776.90
-1632.83
-1419.75
-4091.80
-9302.24
-6690.99
-2228.91
-113.86
-3964.42
-3141.59
-2728.35
-14805.82
-17601.20
-79626.31
-49307.96
-38522.96
-22866.94
-19244.33
-38481.62
143685.00
.L WU
Deflactor Inflation
Rate
L7.
Principal
Year End
(1)-(6)
42577
44210
45629
49721
59024
65715
67943
68057
72022
75163
77892
92697
110299
189925
239233
277756
300623
319867
358349
214664
0.074
0.071
0.069
0.128
0.229
0.160
0.085
0.058
0.121
0.114
0.116
0.281
0.295
0.845
0.407
0.342
0.314
0.381
0.608
0.599
(10)
Payment
Over
Deflator
(3)/(8)x 100
3274
3289
3340
3134
2890
3088
3323
3422
3240
3284
3305
2905
2937
2116
2953
3249
3504
3575
3465
4739
* Effective Interest Rate = Inflation + 5%
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100.00
107.11
114.45
129.15
158.77
184.12
199.76
211.37
236.97
263.98
294.55
377.25
488.39
900.95
1267.30
1700.71
2235.31
3087.44
4964.93
7939.10
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
